Debt and incomplete financial markets: a case for nominal GDP targeting by Sheedy, Kevin D.
  
Kevin D. Sheedy 
Debt and incomplete financial markets: a 
case for nominal GDP targeting 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Sheedy, Kevin D. (2014) Debt and incomplete financial markets: a case for nominal GDP 
targeting. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. pp. 301-373. ISSN 0007-2303  
 
© 2014 The Brookings Institution 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66196/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors 
and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE 
Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research 
Online website.  
301
Kevin D. SheeDy
London School of Economics
Debt and Incomplete Financial Markets: 
A Case for Nominal GDP Targeting
ABSTRACT  For many households borrowing is possible only by accept-
ing a financial contract that specifies a fixed repayment stream. However, the 
future income that will repay this debt is uncertain, so risk can be inefficiently 
distributed. This paper shows that when debt contracts are written in terms of 
money, a monetary policy of nominal GDP targeting improves the functioning 
of financial markets. By insulating households’ nominal incomes from aggre-
gate real shocks, this policy effectively achieves risk sharing by stabilizing the 
ratio of debt to income. The paper also shows that when there is price sticki-
ness, the objective of improving risk sharing should still receive considerable 
weight in the conduct of monetary policy relative to stabilizing inflation.
A t the heart of any argument for a monetary policy strategy lies a view of what are the most important frictions or market failures that mon-
etary policy should seek to mitigate. The canonical justification for infla-
tion targeting as optimal monetary policy rests on the argument that pricing 
frictions in goods markets are of particular concern (see, for example, 
Woodford 2003). With infrequent price adjustment owing to menu costs or 
other nominal rigidities, high or volatile inflation leads to relative price dis-
tortions that impair the efficient operation of markets and that directly con-
sume time and resources in the process of setting prices. Inflation targeting 
is the appropriate policy response to such frictions, because it is able to 
move the economy closer to, or even replicate, what the equilibrium would 
be if prices were flexible. In other words, inflation targeting is able to undo 
or partially circumvent the frictions created by nominal price stickiness.1
This paper argues that nominal price stickiness might not be the most 
serious friction that monetary policy has to contend with. While the use of 
1. In addition to the theoretical case, the more practical merits of implementing inflation 
targeting are discussed by Bernanke and others (1999).
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money as a unit of account in setting infrequently adjusted goods prices 
is well documented, money’s role as a unit of account in writing financial 
contracts is equally pervasive. Moreover, just as price stickiness means that 
nominal prices fail to be fully state contingent, financial contracts are typi-
cally not contingent on all possible future events, an example being debt 
contracts that specify a fixed stream of nominal repayments.
The problem that noncontingent debt contracts raise for risk-averse 
households is that when they are borrowing for long periods, there will 
be considerable uncertainty about the future income from which the fixed 
debt repayments must be made. The issue is not only one of idiosyncratic 
uncertainty—households also do not know the future course the economy 
will take, which will affect their labor income. Will there be a productiv-
ity slowdown, a deep and long-lasting recession, or even a “lost decade” 
of poor economic performance to come? Or will unforeseen technological 
developments or terms-of-trade movements boost future incomes and good 
economic management successfully steer the economy on a path of steady 
growth? Borrowers do not know what aggregate shocks are to come, but 
they must commit to a stream of contractual repayments prior to this infor-
mation being revealed.
The inability to use more complex financial contracts that make repay-
ments contingent on any future events means that financial markets are 
incomplete, in the sense that households do not have access to insurance 
against future risks that could affect their ability to repay debt. Financial 
contracts might not be fully contingent for a variety of reasons, but one 
explanation could be that transaction costs make it prohibitively expensive 
to write and enforce complicated and lengthy contracts. Since many agents, 
such as households, would find it difficult to issue liabilities with state-
contingent repayments resembling equity or derivatives, they must instead 
rely on simple debt contracts if they are to borrow. Thus, in a way that is 
similar to the way menu costs can make prices sticky, transaction costs can 
render financial markets incomplete.
This paper studies the implications for optimal monetary policy of such 
financial-market incompleteness in the form of nominal  noncontingent 
debt contracts. The argument can be understood in terms of which mon-
etary policy strategy is able to undo or mitigate the adverse consequences 
of financial-market incompleteness, just as inflation targeting can be under-
stood as a means of circumventing the problem of nominal price sticki-
ness. For both noncontingent nominal financial contracts and nominal price 
stickiness, it is money’s role as a unit of account that is crucial, and in 
both cases, optimal monetary policy is essentially the choice of a particular 
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nominal anchor that makes money best perform its unit-of-account func-
tion. But in spite of this formal similarity, the optimal nominal anchor turns 
out to be very different when the friction is noncontingent debt contracts 
rather than sticky prices.
The simplicity of noncontingent debt contracts can be seen as coming 
at the price of bundling together two fundamentally different transfers: 
a transfer of consumption from the future to the present for borrowers, 
but also a transfer of aggregate risk to borrowers. The future consump-
tion of borrowers is paid for from the difference between their uncertain 
future incomes and their stream of fixed debt repayments. The more debt 
they have, the more their future income is effectively leveraged, leading to 
greater consumption risk. The flip side of borrowers’ leverage is that savers 
are able to hold a risk-free asset, reducing their consumption risk.
To see the sense in which this bundling together of borrowing and a 
transfer of risk is inefficient, consider what would happen in complete 
financial markets. Individuals would buy or sell state-contingent bonds 
(Arrow-Debreu securities) that make payoffs conditional on particular 
events (or, equivalently, write loan contracts with different repayments 
depending on what happens in the future). Risk-averse borrowers would 
want to sell relatively few bonds paying off in future states of the world 
where GDP and thus incomes are low, and sell relatively more that 
would pay off in good states of the world. As a result, contingent bonds 
paying off in bad states would be relatively expensive and those paying off 
in good states relatively cheap. These price differences would entice sav-
ers to shift away from noncontingent bonds and take on more risk in their 
portfolios. Given that the economy has no risk-free technology for transfer-
ring goods over time, and since aggregate risk cannot be diversified away, 
the efficient outcome is for risk-averse households to share aggregate risk. 
Complete financial markets allow this risk sharing to be unbundled from 
decisions about how much to borrow or save.
The efficient financial contract between risk-averse borrowers and sav-
ers in an economy subject to aggregate income risk (abstracting from idio-
syncratic risk) turns out to closely resemble an “equity share” in GDP. In 
other words, borrowers’ repayments should move in line with GDP, falling 
during recessions and rising during booms. This means the ratio of debt 
liabilities to GDP should be more stable than it would be in a world where 
nominal debt liabilities are fixed in value while GDP fluctuates.
With noncontingent debt contracts, monetary policy has a role to play 
in promoting risk sharing, because these contracts are typically denomi-
nated in terms of money. Hence, the real degree of state contingency in 
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financial contracts depends on the conduct of monetary policy. If the incom-
pleteness of financial markets were the only source of inefficiency in the 
economy, then the optimal monetary policy would aim to make nominally 
 noncontingent debt contracts mimic—through variation in the real value of 
the monetary unit of account—the efficient financial contract that would be 
chosen with complete financial markets.
Since the efficient financial contract between borrowers and savers 
resembles an equity share in GDP, it follows that a goal of monetary 
policy should be to stabilize the ratio of debt liabilities to GDP. With 
noncontingent nominal debt liabilities, this can be achieved by having 
a noncontingent level of nominal income, in other words, a monetary 
policy that targets nominal GDP. Nominal income thus replaces nominal 
goods prices as the optimal nominal anchor. While the central bank cannot 
eliminate uncertainty about future real GDP, it can in principle make the 
level of future nominal GDP (and hence the nominal income of an aver-
age household) perfectly predictable. Removing uncertainty about future 
nominal income thus alleviates the problem of the stream of nominal debt 
repayments being fixed.
A policy of nominal GDP targeting is generally in conflict with infla-
tion targeting, because any fluctuations in real GDP would lead to fluctua-
tions in inflation of the same size and in the opposite direction. Recessions 
would feature higher inflation and booms would feature lower inflation or 
even deflation. These inflation fluctuations could be helpful because they 
would induce variation in the real value of the monetary unit of account, 
making it and the noncontingent debt contracts expressed in terms of 
it behave more like equity. This would promote efficient risk sharing. A 
policy of strict inflation targeting would fix the real value of the monetary 
unit of account, converting nominally noncontingent debt into real non-
contingent debt, which would imply an uneven and generally inefficient 
distribution of risk.
The inflation fluctuations that would occur with nominal GDP target-
ing would entail relative-price distortions if goods prices were sticky, so 
the benefit of risk sharing would probably not be achieved without some 
cost. Whether nominal GDP targeting is preferable to inflation targeting 
is ultimately a quantitative question, whether the inefficiency due to the 
suboptimal risk sharing of noncontingent debt contracts is more important 
than the inefficiency caused by relative-price distortions. Using a calibrated 
model with both nominal debt contracts and sticky prices, optimal mon-
etary policy is found to place a weight of approximately 90 percent on 
promoting risk sharing and 10 percent on stabilizing inflation.
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This paper is related to a number of areas of the literature on monetary 
policy and financial markets. First, there is the empirical work of Bach and 
Stephenson (1974), Cukierman, Lennan, and Papadia (1985), and more 
recently, Doepke and Schneider (2006), who all document the effects of 
inflation in redistributing wealth between debtors and creditors. The nov-
elty here is in studying the implications for optimal monetary policy in an 
environment where inflation fluctuations with such distributional effects 
may actually be desirable precisely because of the incompleteness of finan-
cial markets.
The basic idea of this paper has many precedents in the history of mon-
etary economics, arguably extending back at least to Bailey (1837) (a sur-
vey of the literature is given in Selgin 1995). The contribution here is 
in the modeling and the quantitative analysis of optimal monetary policy 
with nominal debt contracts, not in the fundamental ideas. In the modern 
literature on this question, Selgin (1997) describes the ex-ante efficiency 
advantages of falling prices in good times and rising prices in bad times 
when financial contracts are noncontingent, although there is no formal 
modeling of the argument.2
Pescatori (2007) studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with 
rich and poor households, in the sense of there being an exogenously speci-
fied distribution of assets among otherwise identical households. In that 
environment, both inflation and interest rate fluctuations have redistribu-
tional effects on rich and poor households, and the central bank optimally 
chooses the mix between them. A related paper is that of Lee (2010), who 
develops a model where heterogeneous households choose less than com-
plete consumption insurance because of the presence of convex transaction 
costs in accessing financial markets. Inflation fluctuations expose house-
holds to idiosyncratic labor-income risk, because households work in spe-
cific sectors of the economy, and sectoral relative prices are distorted by 
inflation when prices are sticky. This leads optimal monetary policy to put 
more weight on stabilizing inflation. In contrast to those two papers, the 
argument here is that inflation fluctuations can actually play a positive role 
in completing otherwise incomplete financial markets.
Most recently, and closest in approach to this paper, Koenig (2013) 
has advanced the risk-sharing argument for nominal GDP targeting in 
the context of a two-period model and has also studied the robustness of 
2. Persson and Svensson (1989) is an early example of a model—in the context of an 
international portfolio allocation problem—where it is important how monetary policy 
affects the risk characteristics of nominal debt.
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the results to the possibility of default when there are bankruptcy costs. 
In comparison, the model presented here is more suited to quantitative 
monetary policy analysis, because it brings together incomplete financial 
markets and all the features of the workhorse New Keynesian model in a 
tractable framework.
While the papers above focus on nominal debt contracts in the context 
of household borrowing, the idea that inflation fluctuations may have a 
positive role to play when financial markets are incomplete is now long 
established in the literature on government debt (and has also been recently 
applied by Allen, Carletti, and Gale [2011] in the context of the real value 
of the liquidity available to the banking system). Bohn (1988) developed 
the theory that noncontingent nominal government debt can be desirable 
because when combined with a suitable monetary policy, inflation can 
change the real value of the debt in response to fiscal shocks that would 
otherwise require fluctuations in distortionary tax rates.3
Quantitative analysis of optimal monetary policy of this kind was devel-
oped by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) and expanded further by Chari 
and Kehoe (1999). One finding was that inflation needs to be extremely 
volatile to complete financial markets. As a result, both Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004) argued that once some nominal price rigid-
ity is considered so that inflation fluctuations have a cost, the optimal 
policy becomes very close to strict inflation targeting. This paper shares 
the focus of that literature, using inflation fluctuations to complete mar-
kets, but comes to a different conclusion regarding the magnitude of the 
required inflation fluctuations and whether the costs of those fluctuations 
outweigh the benefits. First, in this paper the benefits of completing mar-
kets are linked to the degree of risk aversion and the degree of heteroge-
neity among households, which are generally unrelated to the benefits of 
avoiding fluctuations in distortionary tax rates and which prove to be large 
in the calibrated model. Second, the earlier results assumed government 
debt with a very short maturity. With longer-maturity debt (in this paper, 
3. There is also a literature that emphasizes the impact of monetary policy on the finan-
cial positions of firms or entrepreneurs in an economy with incomplete financial markets. 
De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011) study a flexible-price economy where there is a costly 
state verification problem for entrepreneurs who issue short-term nominal bonds. Andrés, 
Arce, and Thomas (2010) consider entrepreneurs facing a binding collateral constraint 
who issue short-term nominal bonds with an endogenously determined interest rate spread. 
Vlieghe (2010) also has entrepreneurs facing a collateral constraint, and even though they 
issue real bonds, monetary policy still has real effects on the wealth distribution because 
prices are sticky, so incomes are endogenous.
Kevin D. SheeDy 307
household debt), the costs of the inflation fluctuations needed to complete 
financial markets are much reduced.4
There is also a literature on household debt that emphasizes alterna-
tive frictions, such as credit constraints and interest-rate spreads (Iacoviello 
2005; Cúrdia and Woodford 2009; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni 2011; Egg-
ertsson and Krugman 2012). Finally, the paper is related to the literature 
on nominal GDP targeting (Meade 1978; Bean 1983; Hall and Mankiw 
1994, and more recently, Sumner 2012) but proposes a different argument 
in favor of that policy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I sets out a basic model and 
identifies which monetary policies can support risk sharing when finan-
cial markets are incomplete. Section II introduces a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model that includes both incomplete financial 
markets and sticky prices, and hence a trade-off between mitigating the 
incompleteness of financial markets and avoiding relative-price distortions. 
Optimal monetary policy subject to this trade-off is studied in section III. 
Section IV shows how the full model can be calibrated and presents a quan-
titative analysis of optimal monetary policy. Finally, section V draws some 
conclusions.
I. A Model of a Pure Credit Economy
The analysis begins with a simplified model that studies household bor-
rowing and saving in a finite-horizon endowment economy with incom-
plete financial markets. A full DSGE model with incomplete markets 
together with labor supply, production, and sticky prices is presented in 
section II.
I.A. Assumptions
The economy contains two groups of households, “borrowers” (b) and 
“savers” (s), each making up 50 percent of a measure-one population. 
Household types are indexed by t ∈ {b, s}. There are three time periods 
t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. All households have preferences represented by the utility 
function:
 E C C C(1)
1 1 1
,
,0
1
,1
1
2 ,2
1
=
− α
+ δ
− α
+ δ
− α



τ
τ
−α
τ
−α
τ
−α
4. This point is made by Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008) in the context of government 
debt.
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where Ct,t is per-person consumption by households of type t at time t. 
All households have the same subjective discount factor d and the same 
coefficient of relative risk aversion a. Real GDP Yt is an exogenous endow-
ment. The level of GDP in period 0 is nonstochastic, but subsequent real 
GDP growth rates gt = (Yt - Yt-1)/Yt-1 are uncertain. Household types are 
distinguished by the shares they receive of this endowment at different 
dates. The ratio of borrowers’ per-person incomes to per-person real GDP 
is denoted by the parameter yt, and hence household incomes at time t are:
Y Y Y Yt t t t t t( )= ψ = − ψ(2) , and 2 .b, s,
The income shares yt are known with certainty in period 0. Given that both 
household types have the same time preferences, the households labeled 
as borrowers will indeed choose to borrow from the savers in equilibrium 
when the sequence {y0, y1, y2} is increasing. In other words, borrowers are 
those households with initially low incomes relative to savers, while savers 
anticipate having a relatively low income in the future. In what follows, the 
analysis is simplified by assuming the particular monotonic sequence of 
income shares below:
E g g(3) 1 1 1 , 1, and 2.0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2[ ]( ) ( )ψ = − δ + + ψ = ψ =−α −α
It is assumed that the subjective discount factor d is sufficiently low rela-
tive to expected real GDP growth so that y0 ≥ 0.
Financial markets are incomplete in the sense that only nominal bonds 
can be issued or held by households. It is assumed that borrowers can-
not issue liabilities with state-contingent nominal payoffs, and all non-
contingent bonds are denominated in terms of money. It is assumed that 
a single type of bond is traded at each date. Each bond issued in period 0 
is a promise to repay one unit of money in period 1, and g units of money 
in period 2. The parameter g determines the duration, or average maturity, 
of the bonds (g = 0 is one-period debt, while larger values of g represent 
longer-term debt contracts). Each bond issued in period 1 is simply a 
promise to repay one unit of money in period 2. Note that in period 1, 
an outstanding bond from period 0 is equivalent to g newly issued bonds 
(old bonds are therefore counted in terms of new-bond equivalents from 
period 1 onwards). Households can take positive or negative positions in 
bonds (save or borrow) with no limit on borrowing except being able to 
repay in all states of the world. There is no default, and so all bonds are 
risk-free in nominal terms.
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Households begin with no initial assets or debts and must leave no debts 
at the end of period 2. The net bond position per person of type-t house-
holds at the end of period t is denoted by Bt,t, the nominal bond price is Qt 
at date t, and the price of goods in terms of money is Pt. The flow budget 
identities are:
C Q B
P
Y C Q B
P
Y
Q B
P
C Y B
P
(4) , 1 ,
and ,
,0
0 ,0
0
,0 ,1
1 ,1
1
,1
1 ,0
1
,2 ,2
,1
2
( )
+ = + = +
+ γ
= +
τ
τ
τ τ
τ
τ
τ
τ τ
τ
with the term (1 + gQ1) being the sum of the period-1 coupon payment from 
period-0 bonds and the market value of the period-2 repayment, the latter 
equivalent in value to g newly issued bonds. Money in this economy is sim-
ply a unit of account used in writing financial contracts. Monetary policy 
is assumed to determine the inflation rate pt = (Pt - Pt−1) /Pt−1 at each date.
I.B. Equilibrium
Maximizing the utility function (equation 1) subject to the budget identi-
ties (equation 4) implies Euler equations that must hold for both household 
types t ∈ {b, s} at dates t ∈ {0, 1}:
( )
, ,
5 1 1
1
1C
Q P
Q P Ct t
t t
t t
tτ
α
τ
αδ γ− +
+
+
−
=
+( )


E  .
In equilibrium, the goods and bond markets must clear at all dates:
+ =
C C
Yt t t(6) 2 2 ;
b, s,
+ =
B Bt t(7)
2 2
0.b, s,
In what follows, let ct,t ≡ Ct,t /Yt denote the ratios of consumption to GDP, 
and define the variables dt, lt, rt, and rt as follows:
E
d Q B
PY
l Q B
PY
r
Q P
Q P r
t
t t
t t
t
t t
t t
t
t t
t t
t t t
(8) 1
2
1
,
1
2
,
1 1 , and .
b, 1 b,
1
1
1
( )
( )
≡ −
+ γ
≡ −
+ ≡
+ γ ρ ≡
−
−
−
+
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As will be confirmed in equilibrium, Bb,t ≤ 0 and Bs,t ≥ 0, so dt can be 
interpreted as the gross debt-to-GDP ratio (the beginning-of-period value 
of debt liabilities per person relative to GDP), and lt as the end-of-period 
value of all bonds issued per person relative to GDP, referred to as the 
loans-to-GDP ratio. The variable rt is the ex-post real return on holding 
bonds between periods t - 1 and t. Note that this is not the same as the 
interest rate on those bonds, which refers to the ex-ante expected real 
return rt. Finally, it is convenient to express the equations in terms of the 
yield-to-maturity, denoted by jt, rather than the bond price Qt. Given the 
coupon payments on the bonds issued in periods 0 and 1, the price-yield 
relationships are:
Q j j Q j(9)
1
1 1
, and 1
1
.0
0 0
2 1
1( )= + +
γ
+
=
+
With the definitions (equation 8), the equations of the model are:
d r
g
lt t
t
t(10) 11 ;1=
+
+



 −
( ) ( ) ( )= − − = − + −
= =
c d l c d l
d l
t t t t t t t t(11) 2 , 2 2 ,
with 0, and 0; and
b, s,
0 2
c c
Ec r g ct t t t t(12) 1 1 ,, 1 1 , 1[ ]( )( )= δ + +τ−α + + −α τ +−α
where equation 10 follows directly from equation 8, equation 11 is derived 
from the budget identities (equation 4) and the market-clearing condition 
(equation 7), and equation 12 is derived from the Euler equations (5). 
Finally, equation 8 and the definition of the yield-to-maturity in equation 9 
imply:
r
j j
j
r
j(13) 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
, and 1 1
1
.1
0
1
1
0
2
1
2
+ =
+
+ pi




+
γ
+
+
γ
+






+ =
+
+ pi
It is assumed that the parameter restriction (equation 3) always holds in 
what follows.
In the case where there is no uncertainty about the path of real GDP 
(g1 = g–1 and g2 = g–2, where g–1 and g–2 are nonstochastic), and where there 
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are no unexpected changes in inflation (p1 = p–1 and p2 = p–2), the system of 
equations 10–12 and equation 13 has the following solution:
c c r
g
r
g
t t
( ) ( )
= = + =
+
δ + =
+
δ
α α
(14) 1, 1 1 , and 1 1 ;b, s, 1 1 2 2
( )= δ + =−αd g d(15)
2
1 , and 1
2
; and1 2
1
2
l g g l g(16)
2
1 1 , and
2
1 .0
2
1
1
2
1
1 2
1( ) ( ) ( )= δ + + = δ +−α −α −α
The equilibrium interest rates (equal here to the ex-post real rates of return 
r–1 and r–2) are identical to what would prevail if there were a representa-
tive household. The choice of income shares in equation 3 means that in 
the absence of shocks, borrowers and savers would have the same levels 
of consumption. Given the levels of income and consumption, the implied 
final debt-to-GDP ratio is 50 percent, and given equation 3, the debt-to-
GDP and loans-to-GDP ratios at earlier dates are discounted values of the 
final debt-to-GDP ratio (adjusted for any real GDP growth). This steady 
state is independent of monetary policy. The values of the inflation rates p–1 
and p–2 together with the real interest rates r–1 and r–2 determine the nominal 
bond yields j–0 and j–1.
I.C. The Complete Financial Markets Benchmark
Consider a hypothetical economy that has complete financial markets 
but which is otherwise identical to the economy described above. House-
holds now have access to a complete set of state-contingent bonds (traded 
sequentially, period-by-period), denominated in real terms without loss of 
generality. Let F*t,t+1 denote the contingent bonds per person held between 
periods t and t + 1 by households of type t (the asterisk signifies complete 
financial markets). The prices of these securities in real terms relative to 
the conditional probabilities of the states at time t are denoted by Kt+1, so 
Et [Kt+1 F*t,t+1] is the date-t cost of the date-t + 1 payoff F*t,t+1.
In this version of the model, the flow budget identities (equation 4) 
are replaced by
EC K F Y Ft t t t t t(17) * * *,, 1 , 1 , ,+   = +τ + τ + τ τ
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together with initial and terminal conditions F*t,0 = 0 and F*t,3 = 0. The Euler 
equations for maximizing utility (equation 1) subject to equation 17 are:
C
C
K
C
C
t
t
t
t
t
δ

 = = δ




+
−α
+
+
−α
(18) *
*
*
*
,
b, 1
b,
1
s, 1
s,
which hold in all states of the world. The market-clearing condition F*b,t /2 + 
F*s,t /2 = 0 replaces equation 7.
To relate the economy with complete markets to its incomplete-markets 
equivalent, consider the following definitions of variables d*t, l*t, and r*t, 
which will be seen to be the equivalents of the debt-to-GDP ratio dt, the 
loans-to-GDP ratio lt, and the ex-post real return rt in the incomplete-
markets economy (as given in equation 8):
≡ − ≡ −
 
+ ≡  
+ +
−
E
E
d F
Y
l
K F
Y
r
F
K F
t
t
t
t
t t t
t
t
t
t t t
(19) * 1
2
*
, *
1
2
*
,
and 1 *
*
*
.
b, 1 b, 1
b,
1 b,
Debt in an economy with complete financial markets refers to the total 
gross value of the contingent bonds repayable in the realized state of 
the world. Loans refers to the value of the whole portfolio of contin-
gent bonds issued by borrowers, and the (gross) ex-post real return is the 
state-contingent value of the bonds repayable relative to the value of all 
the bonds previously issued.
The definitions in equation 19 directly imply that equation 10 must hold 
in terms of c*t, t, d*t, l*t , and r*t. The budget identities (equation 17) and the 
contingent bond-market clearing conditions imply that equation 11 holds 
in terms of the variables defined in equation 19. Since Et [(1 + r*t+1)Kt+1] = 1 
follows from the definition in equation 19, the first-order conditions (equa-
tion 18) imply that equation 12 must hold in terms of c*t,t and r*t . Hence, the 
block of equations 10–12 applies to both the incomplete- and complete-
markets economies.
However, the first-order condition (equation 18) with complete markets 
has stronger implications than equation 12. It also requires
c
c
c
c
t
t
t
t
=
+ +(20) *
*
*
*
,
b, 1
b,
s, 1
s,
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to hold in all states of the world. This equation states that consumption 
growth rates must always be equalized between borrowers and savers; in 
other words, households use complete financial markets to share risk. This 
is not generally an implication of the equilibrium conditions in equations 
10–12 and equation 13 with incomplete financial markets. Furthermore, 
since a complete-markets economy has no restriction on the types of assets 
that households can buy and sell, equation 13 that determines the ex-post 
real return on a portfolio of nominal bonds is now irrelevant to determin-
ing the equilibrium of the complete-markets economy. The relevant ex-
post real return is now determined implicitly by the portfolio of contingent 
securities that ensures that the risk-sharing condition (equation 20) holds.
The complete-markets equilibrium can be obtained analytically by solv-
ing the system of equations 10–12 and equation 20 (again under the param-
eter restriction in equation 3). The equilibrium consumption-GDP ratios 
are c*t,t = 1, so there is full risk sharing between borrowers and savers; 
this means that all households’ consumption levels perfectly co-move in 
response to shocks (the consumption levels are equal owing to the param-
eter restriction in equation 3). Complete financial markets therefore allo-
cate consumption efficiently across states of the world, as well as over 
time. The equilibrium values of other variables have similar expressions to 
those found in the nonstochastic case (equations 14–16), except that now, 
uncertain outcomes are replaced by conditional expectations:
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The final debt-to-GDP ratio d*2 is nonstochastic, and earlier debt-to-GDP 
ratios depend only on conditional expectations of future real GDP growth 
rates. Since the realization of shocks in period 1 can change these condi-
tional expectations, d*1 and l*1 are stochastic in general. The expressions for 
l*0, l*1, and d*1 can be interpreted as the present discounted values in periods 
0 or 1 of a payoff proportional to the final debt-to-GDP ratio d*2, evaluated 
using prices of contingent securities (which are equal to households’ com-
mon stochastic discount factor according to equation 18). Intuitively, the 
complete-markets portfolio is an equity share in future real GDP. This sup-
ports risk sharing by allowing the repayments of borrowers to move exactly 
in line with their incomes.
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Finally, observe that the complete-markets equilibrium has a particu-
larly simple form in two special cases. If the utility function is logarithmic 
(a = 1) or real GDP follows a random walk (gt is i.i.d.), then d*t and l*t are 
all nonstochastic:
E
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The complete-markets equilibrium is entirely independent of monetary 
policy in all cases.
I.D. Replicating Complete Financial Markets
The block of equations 10–12 is common to the economy’s equilibrium 
conditions irrespective of whether financial markets are complete or not. 
The only difference is that the incomplete-markets economy includes equa-
tion 13 as an equilibrium condition instead of equation 20 in the complete-
markets economy. Since equation 13 includes the inflation rates p1 and 
p2, the ability of monetary policy to engineer a suitable state-contingent 
path for inflation means that the ex-post real returns in equation 13 can be 
chosen to generate the same consumption allocation as implied by the risk-
sharing condition (equation 20). This is equivalent to ensuring the actual 
debt-to-GDP ratio dt mimics its hypothetical equilibrium value d*t in the 
economy with complete financial markets.
The monetary policy that replicates complete financial markets in this 
way turns out to be a nominal GDP target. Nominal GDP is denoted by Nt = 
PtYt, and its growth rate is denoted by nt = (Nt - Nt−1)/Nt−1. Since it is assumed 
that monetary policy can determine a state-contingent path for inflation pt, 
and since real GDP growth gt is exogenous, monetary policy can equally 
well be specified as a sequence of nominal GDP growth rates nt. Equation 13 
for the ex-post real returns on nominal bonds can be written in terms of 
nominal GDP growth as follows:
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Consider first the replication argument in either of the special cases of log 
utility (a = 1) or real GDP following a random walk (gt is an i.i.d. stochastic 
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process). In these special cases, the complete-markets debt-to-GDP ratios 
(equation 23) that monetary policy is aiming to replicate are nonstochastic. 
Suppose monetary policy sets a nonstochastic path for nominal GDP, that 
is, n1 = n–1 and n2 = n–2 for some constants n–1 and n–2. If the replication is 
successful, ct,t = 1, and so both households’ Euler equations (12) are satis-
fied when 1 = dEt [(1 + rt+1)(1 + gt+1)-a]. With n2 = n–2 and equation 24, this 
requires, for t = 1:
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using the definition of b from equation 23. It then follows from equation 24 
that (1 + r2)/(1 + g2) = 1/b. From the complete-markets solution (equation 
23) together with equation 10, (1 + r*2 )/(1 + g2) = 1/b, so this monetary 
policy ensures that the ex-post real return r2 on nominal bonds is identical 
to that on the complete-markets portfolio r*2  for all realizations of shocks. 
Similarly, with n1 = n–1 and the solution g/(1 + j1) = bg/(1 + n–2) from above, 
the Euler equation at t = 0 requires:
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so (1 + r1)/(1 + g1) = 1/b, which coincides with (1 + r*1 )/(1 + g1) = 1/b. 
Therefore, r1 = r*1  and r2 = r*2  under this monetary policy, which establishes 
that dt = d*t  and ct,t = c*t,t. A nominal GDP target with any nonstochastic rates 
of nominal GDP growth succeeds in replicating the complete- markets equi-
librium and supporting risk sharing among borrowers and savers. The intu-
ition is that if the numerator of the debt-to-GDP ratio (expressed in monetary 
units) is fixed because nominal debt liabilities are not state- contingent, the 
ratio can be stabilized by targeting the denominator (expressed in monetary 
units), that is, ensuring that nominal incomes are predictable.
There is one other special case in which a monetary policy that makes 
nominal GDP growth perfectly predictable manages to replicate complete 
financial markets, even when the complete-markets debt-to-GDP ratio d*1 
is stochastic. This is the case where borrowers do not need to issue any 
new debt and do not need to refinance any existing debt after the initial 
time period. In the model, this corresponds to the limiting case of pure 
long-term bonds, where g → ∞ (g is the ratio of the period-2 and period-1 
coupon payments on a bond issued in period 0). If monetary policy ensures 
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that (1+n1) (1+n2) = (1+n–)2 for some nonstochastic n–, then the equilibrium 
of the economy will coincide with the hypothetical complete-markets equi-
librium. Unlike the earlier special cases, here it is not necessary that both 
the period 1 and 2 nominal GDP growth rates be nonstochastic; it is only 
necessary that the cumulated growth rate over both time periods be per-
fectly predictable. Intuitively, with long-term debt, monetary policy needs 
only to ensure that nominal incomes are predictable when debt is actually 
repaid.
When g is finite, some existing debt must be repaid by borrowers in 
period 1, requiring them to issue some new bonds if they are to continue to 
borrow until period 2. This exposes them to risk coming from uncertainty 
about the interest rate that will prevail in period 1. A monetary policy that 
aims to replicate complete financial markets must then address refinancing 
risk as well as income risk. In general, this requires a target for nominal 
GDP growth that changes when shocks occur, although as will be seen, 
there will still be a long-run target for nominal GDP that is invariant to 
shocks. If the maturity parameter g is positive and finite, then the monetary 
policies that replicate complete financial markets are characterized by the 
following nominal GDP growth rates in periods 1 and 2:
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where n–1 and n–2 are any nonstochastic growth rates (these would be the 
actual nominal GDP growth rates in the absence of shocks). Note that any 
such monetary policy has the implication that
n n n n(26) 1 1 1 1 ,1 2 1 2( )( ) ( )( )+ + = + +
so the long-run target for nominal GDP must be nonstochastic. In the 
special cases of a = 1 or gt being i.i.d., which were analyzed earlier, the 
requirements on nominal GDP growth rates in equation 25 reduce simply 
to n1 = n–1 and n2 = n–2. Intuitively, the problem of refinancing risk is absent 
in these special cases, albeit for a different reason in each case. When real 
GDP growth rates are independent over time, there is no news that changes 
expected future real GDP growth, and thus no reason for the equilibrium 
real interest rate to vary over time. On the other hand, with log utility, the 
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real interest rate changes by the same amount and in the same direction as 
any revision to expectations of future growth. Higher real interest rates are 
then exactly offset by expectations of an improvement in future incomes 
relative to current incomes. This leaves monetary policy needing only to 
provide insurance against fluctuations in current incomes, and for this any 
predictable nominal GDP growth rate suffices.
As discussed above, in the special case of pure long-term debt (g → ∞), 
equation 26 is needed, but equation 25 need not hold. In the special case 
of pure short-term debt (g = 0), it can be shown that only the condition on 
n1 in equation 25 is needed, together with the restriction that n2 take on any 
value that is perfectly predictable in period 1.
I.E. Discussion
The importance of the arguments for nominal GDP targeting in this 
paper obviously depends on the plausibility of the incomplete-markets 
assumption in the context of household borrowing and saving. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that households will not find it easy to borrow by 
issuing Arrow-Debreu state-contingent bonds, but might there be other 
ways of reaching the same goal? Issuing state-contingent bonds is equiva-
lent to households’ agreeing to loan contracts with financial intermediaries 
that specify a complete menu of state-contingent repayments. But such 
contracts would be much more time consuming to write, harder to under-
stand, and more complicated to enforce than conventional noncontingent 
loan contracts, as well as making monitoring and assessment of default 
risk a more elaborate exercise. Moreover, unlike firms, households can-
not issue securities such as equity that feature state-contingent payments 
but do not require a complete description of the schedule of payments in 
advance.
Another possibility is that even if households are restricted to non- 
contingent borrowing, they can hedge their exposure to future income risk 
by purchasing an asset with returns that are negatively correlated with GDP. 
But there are several pitfalls to this. First, it may be unclear which asset 
has a reliably negative correlation with GDP (even if “GDP securities” of 
the type proposed by Shiller [1993] were available, borrowers would need 
a short position in these). Second, the required gross positions for hedging 
may be very large. Third, a household already intending to borrow will 
need to borrow even more to buy the asset for hedging purposes, and the 
amount of borrowing may be limited by an initial down payment constraint 
and subsequent margin calls. In practice, a typical borrower does not have 
a significant portfolio of assets except for a house, and housing returns 
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probably lack the negative correlation with GDP required for hedging the 
relevant risks.
In spite of these difficulties, it might be argued that the case for the 
incomplete-markets assumption is overstated because the possibilities of 
renegotiation, default, and bankruptcy introduce some contingency into 
apparently noncontingent debt contracts. However, default and bankruptcy 
allow for only a crude form of contingency in extreme circumstances, and 
these options are not without their costs. Renegotiation is also not costless, 
and evidence from consumer mortgages in both the recent U.S. housing 
bust and the Great Depression suggests that the extent of  renegotiation 
may be inefficiently low (White 2009; Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010; Ghent 
2011). Furthermore, even ex-post efficient renegotiation of a contract with 
no contingencies written in ex-ante need not actually provide for efficient 
sharing of risk from an ex-ante perspective. In a more general model where 
the incompleteness of financial markets is endogenized, the inflation fluc-
tuations induced by nominal GDP targeting may also play a role in mini-
mizing the costs of contract renegotiation or default when the economy is 
hit by an aggregate shock.
It is also possible to assess the completeness of markets indirectly 
through tests of the efficient risk-sharing condition, which is equivalent 
to a perfect correlation between the consumption growth rates of differ-
ent households. These tests are the subject of a large literature (Cochrane 
1991; Nelson 1994; Attanasio and Davis 1996; Hayashi, Altonji, and 
Kotlikoff 1996), which has generally rejected the hypothesis of full risk 
sharing.
Finally, even if financial markets are incomplete, the assumption that 
contracts are written in terms of specifically nominal noncontingent pay-
ments is important for the analysis. The evidence presented in Doepke and 
Schneider (2006) indicates that household balance sheets contain signifi-
cant quantities of nominal liabilities and assets (for assets, it is important 
to account for indirect exposure via households’ ownership of firms and 
financial intermediaries). Furthermore, as pointed out by Shiller (1997), 
indexation of private debt contracts is extremely rare. This suggests that the 
model’s assumptions are not unrealistic.
The workings of nominal GDP targeting can also be understood from its 
implications for inflation and the real value of nominal liabilities. Indeed, 
nominal GDP targeting can be equivalently described as a policy of induc-
ing a perfect negative correlation between the price level and real GDP and 
ensuring these variables have the same volatility. When real GDP falls, 
inflation increases, which reduces the real value of fixed nominal liabilities 
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in proportion to the fall in real income; when real GDP rises, the opposite 
takes place.
It is perhaps surprising that optimal monetary policy in a non- 
representative-agent model should feature inflation fluctuations, given the 
long tradition of regarding inflation-induced unpredictability in the real val-
ues of contractual payments as one of the most consequential costs of infla-
tion. As discussed by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), there is a widely 
held view that the difficulties this induces in long-term financial planning 
ought to be regarded as the most significant cost of inflation, more signifi-
cant than the relative price distortions, menu costs, and deviations from the 
Friedman rule that have been stressed in representative-agent models. The 
view that unanticipated inflation leads to inefficient or inequitable redis-
tributions between debtors and creditors clearly presupposes a world of 
incomplete markets, otherwise inflation would not have these effects. How 
then to reconcile this argument with the result that the incompleteness of 
financial markets suggests nominal GDP targeting is desirable because it 
supports efficient risk sharing? (Again, were markets complete, monetary 
policy would be irrelevant to risk sharing because all opportunities would 
already be exploited.)
While nominal GDP targeting does imply unpredictable inflation fluc-
tuations, the resulting real transfers between debtors and creditors are not 
an arbitrary redistribution—they are perfectly correlated with the relevant 
fundamental shocks: unpredictable movements in aggregate real incomes. 
Since future consumption uncertainty is affected by income risk as well 
as risk from fluctuations in the real value of nominal contracts, long-term 
financial planning is not necessarily compromised by inflation fluctuations 
that have known correlations with the economy’s fundamentals. An effi-
cient distribution of risk requires just such fluctuations, because the provi-
sion of insurance is impossible without the possibility of ex-post transfers 
that cannot be predicted ex-ante. Unpredictable movements in inflation 
orthogonal to the economy’s fundamentals (such as would occur in the 
presence of monetary-policy shocks) are inefficient from a risk-sharing 
perspective, but there is no contradiction with nominal GDP targeting 
because such movements would only occur if policy failed to stabilize 
nominal GDP.
It might be objected that if debtors and creditors really wanted such 
contingent transfers then they would write them into the contracts they 
agree to, and it would be wrong for the central bank to try to second-guess 
their intentions. But the absence of such contingencies from observed con-
tracts may simply reflect market incompleteness rather than what would be 
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rationally chosen in a frictionless world. Reconciling the noncontingent 
nature of financial contracts with complete markets is not impossible, but 
it would require both substantial differences in risk tolerance across house-
holds and a high correlation of risk tolerance with whether a household is a 
saver or a borrower. With assumptions on preferences that make borrowers 
risk-neutral or savers extremely risk-averse, it would not be efficient to 
share risk, even if no frictions prevented households from writing contracts 
to implement it.
There are a number of problems with this alternative interpretation of 
the observed prevalence of noncontingent contracts. First, there is no 
compelling evidence to suggest that borrowers really are risk-neutral or 
that savers are extremely risk-averse relative to borrowers. Second, while 
there is evidence suggesting considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ risk 
tolerance (Barsky and others 1997; Cohen and Einav 2007), most of this 
heterogeneity is not explained by observable characteristics such as age 
and net worth (even though many characteristics such as these have some 
correlation with risk tolerance). The dispersion in risk tolerance among 
individuals with similar observed characteristics also suggests there should 
be a wide range of types of financial contract with different degrees of con-
tingency if markets were complete. Risk-neutral borrowers would agree to 
noncontingent contracts with risk-averse savers, but contingent contracts 
would be offered to risk-averse borrowers.
Another problem with this interpretation based on complete markets 
but different risk preferences relates to the behavior of the price level 
over time. While nominal GDP has never been an explicit target of mon-
etary policy, the implication of nominal GDP targeting—a countercyclical 
price level—has been largely true in the United States during the postwar 
period (Cooley and Ohanian, 1991), albeit with a correlation coefficient 
much smaller than one in absolute value, and a lower volatility relative to 
real GDP. Whether by accident or design, U.S. monetary policy has had 
some of the features of nominal GDP targeting, resulting in real values 
of fixed nominal payments positively co-moving with real GDP (but by 
less) on average. In a world of complete markets with extreme differences 
in risk tolerance between savers and borrowers, efficient contracts would 
undo the real contingency of payments brought about by the countercy-
clicality of the price level, for example through indexation clauses. But as 
discussed in Shiller (1997), private nominal debt contracts have survived 
in this environment without any noticeable shift toward indexation. Fur-
thermore, both the volatility of inflation and the correlation of the price 
level with real GDP have changed significantly over time; for example, 
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the high volatility of the 1970s may be contrasted with the “Great Mod-
eration,” and the countercyclicality of the postwar price level may be 
contrasted with its procyclicality during the interwar period. The basic 
form of noncontingent nominal contracts has remained constant in spite 
of this change.
Finally, while the policy recommendation of this paper goes against the 
long tradition of citing the avoidance of redistribution between debtors and 
creditors as an argument for price stability, there is a similarly ancient tra-
dition in monetary economics (which can be traced back at least to Bailey 
1837) of arguing that money prices should co-move inversely with produc-
tivity to promote “fairness” between debtors and creditors. The idea is that 
if money prices fall when productivity rises, those savers who receive fixed 
nominal incomes are able to share in the gains, while the rise in prices at a 
time of falling productivity helps to ameliorate the burden of repayment for 
borrowers. This is equivalent to stabilizing the money value of incomes, in 
other words, nominal GDP targeting. The intellectual history of this idea 
(the “productivity norm”) is thoroughly surveyed in Selgin (1995). Like 
the older literature, this paper places distributional questions at the heart 
of monetary policy analysis, but it studies policy through the lens of miti-
gating inefficiencies in incomplete financial markets rather than through 
looser notions of fairness.
II. Incomplete Financial Markets in a Monetary DSGE Model
This section develops a model that allows optimal monetary policy with 
incomplete financial markets to be studied in an infinite-horizon production 
economy that includes price stickiness as an additional friction.
II.A. Households
In this model, there are equal numbers of two types of households, 
referred to as borrowers and savers (t ∈ {b, s}). A representative household 
of type t has preferences given by the following utility function
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where Ct,t is per-household consumption of a composite good and Ht,t 
is hours of labor supplied. The two types are now distinguished by their 
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subjective discount factors, with dt,t being the discount factor of type-t 
households between time t and t+1. Both types have a constant coefficient 
of relative risk aversion given by a, and a constant elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution given by a-1. The household-specific Frisch elasticity of 
labor supply is ht. Each household of type t receives real income Yt,t at 
time t, to be specified below. The discount factor dt,t of type-t households 
is assumed to be the following:
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and where the parameters Db, Ds, and l are such that 0 < Db < Ds < ∞ and 
0 < l < 1. It is assumed individual households of type t take dt,t as given, 
that is, they do not internalize the effect of their own consumption on the 
discount factor.
There are two differences compared to a representative-household 
model with a standard time-separable utility function. First, there is het-
erogeneity in discount factors because borrowers are more impatient than 
savers (Db < Ds), all else equal. This is the key assumption that will give 
rise to borrowing and saving in equilibrium by the households that have 
been referred to as borrowers and savers. Second, discount factors display 
the marginal increasing impatience (l < 1) property of Uzawa (1968), in 
that the discount factor is lower when consumption is higher (relative to 
income), all else equal. This assumption is invoked for technical reasons 
because it ensures that the wealth distribution will be stationary around 
a well-defined nonstochastic steady state. That households take discount 
factors as given is assumed for simplicity and is analogous to models of 
“external” habits (see, for example, Abel 1990).
The composite good Ct,t is a CES aggregate (with elasticity of substitu-
tion e) of a measure-one continuum of differentiated goods indexed by 
ı ∈ [0, 1], which is the same for both types of households. Households allo-
cate spending Ct,t(ı) between goods to minimize the nominal expenditure 
PtCt,t required to obtain Ct,t units of the consumption aggregator:
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where Pt(ı) is the nominal price of good ı. Households of type t face a real 
wage wt,t for their labor. All households own equal (nontradable) share-
holdings in a measure-one continuum of firms, with firm ı paying real 
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dividend Jt (ı). All households are assumed to face a common lump-sum 
tax Tt in real terms. Real disposable income for households of type t is thus
∫ ( )= + −
[ ]
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0,1
II.B. Incomplete Financial Markets
The only liability that can be issued by households is a noncontingent 
nominal bond. The nominal bond has the following structure. One newly 
issued bond at time t makes a stream of coupon payments in subsequent 
time periods, paying 1 unit of money (a normalization) at time t + 1, then g 
units at t + 2, g2 units at t + 3, and so on (0 ≤ g < ∞). The geometric structure 
of the coupon payments means that a bond issued at time t - , is after its 
time-t coupon payment equivalent to a quantity g, of new date-t bonds. It 
therefore suffices to track the overall quantity of bonds in terms of new-
bond equivalents, rather than the quantities of each vintage separately.5 The 
flow budget identity at time t of households of type t is:
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where Bt,t denotes the outstanding quantity of bonds (in terms of new-bond 
equivalents) held (or issued, if negative) by type-t households at the end 
of period t. The term 1 + gQt refers to the coupon payment plus the resale 
value of bonds acquired or issued in the past.
II.C. Firms
Firm ı ∈ [0, 1] is the monopoly producer of differentiated good ı. Goods 
are produced using an aggregator of labor inputs. Production of good ı is 
denoted by Yt(ı), firm ı’s labor usage by Ht(ı), and wt denotes the wage cost 
per unit of Ht(ı). The firm pays out all real profits at time t as dividends Jt(ı):
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5. Woodford (2001) uses this modeling device to study long-term government debt. See 
Garriga, Kydland, and Šustek (2013) for a richer model of mortgage contracts.
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The first equation following the definition of profits is the production function, 
with At denoting the common exogenous productivity level and where the 
parameter x determines the extent of diminishing returns to labor (x ≥ 0). 
The final equation in (32) is the demand function that arises from the 
household expenditure minimization problem (equation 33).
The labor input Ht (ı) is an aggregator of labor supplied by the two types 
of households. Firms receive a proportional wage-bill subsidy at rate e-1. 
Firms choose labor inputs Ht,t (ı) to minimize the post-subsidy cost wt Ht (ı) 
of obtaining a unit of the aggregate labor input Ht (ı):
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The labor aggregator has a Cobb-Douglas functional form, implying a unit 
elasticity of substitution between different labor types.
II.D. Sticky Prices
Price adjustment is assumed to be staggered according to the Calvo (1983) 
pricing model. In each time period, there is a probability s that firm ı must 
continue to use its previous nominal price Pt-1(ı). If at time t a firm does 
receive an opportunity to change price, it sets a reset price denoted by Pˆt. 
The reset price is set to maximize the current and expected future stream of 
profits. Future profits conditional on continuing to charge Pˆt are multiplied 
by the probability s, that the reset price will actually remain in use  peri-
ods ahead, and then are discounted using the real interest rate rt.
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II.E. Money and Monetary Policy
The economy is “cashless” in that money is not required for transac-
tions, but money is used as a unit of account in writing financial contracts 
and in pricing goods. Monetary policy is assumed to be able to determine 
a path for the price level Pt.
II.F. Fiscal Policy
The only role of fiscal policy is to provide the wage-bill subsidy to firms 
by collecting equal amounts of a lump-sum tax from all households. It is 
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assumed that the fiscal budget is in balance, so taxes Tt are set at the level 
required to fund the current subsidy:6
∫ ( )( ) ( )= ε +
[ ]
−T w H w Ht t t t tı ı ı(35) d .1 b, b, s, s,
0,1
II.G. Market Clearing
Market clearing in goods, labor, and bond markets requires:
C C Yt t tı ı ı ı(36) 12
1
2
, for all 0,1 ;b, s, [ ]( ) ( ) ( )+ = ∈
H Ht tı ı(37) d 12 , for all b, s ;,0,1 ,∫ { }( ) = τ ∈[ ] τ τ
B Bt t(38) 12
1
2
0.b, s,+ =
II.H. Equilibrium
The derivation of the equilibrium conditions is presented in the online 
appendix.7 The analysis of incomplete financial markets follows the 
method used for the simple model in section I, while other aspects of the 
model are standard features of New Keynesian models with sticky prices. 
The consumption-to-GDP ratios are ct,t ≡ Ct,t /Yt, and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio dt, loans-to-GDP ratio lt, ex-post real return rt, and real interest rate rt 
are defined as in equation 8. The yield-to-maturity jt on the nominal bonds 
is defined by:



Q j j Qt t t t
(39)
1
, implying 1 1 .
1
1
∑ ( )=
γ
+
= − + γ
−
=
∞
As in the simple model of section I, the analysis will also make use of an 
otherwise identical model where financial markets are complete, where the 
equivalents of d*t, l*t, and r*t are as defined in equation 19.
6. The wage-bill subsidy is a standard assumption which ensures the economy’s steady 
state is not distorted (Woodford 2003). A balanced-budget rule is assumed to avoid any inter-
actions between fiscal policy and financial markets.
7. Online appendixes for this volume may be found at the Brookings Papers website, 
www.brookings.edu/bpea, under “Past Editions.”
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In a steady state where exogenous productivity At is growing at a con-
stant rate, there is a steady-state rate of real GDP growth g–. The steady-
state consumption-GDP ratios are given by
c c(40) 1 , 1 , where 1
1
,b s
b s
1
b s
1
( )
( )= − θ = + θ θ ≡
− ∆ ∆
+ ∆ ∆
( )
( )
−λ α
−λ α
where 0 < q < 1. The term q depends on the relative patience Db/Ds of 
the two household types and the utility-function parameters a and l. The 
steady-state discount factors and real interest rate are:
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( )
δ = δ = δ ≡ ∆ + ∆
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and it is assumed that g– is low enough to ensure that 0 < b < 1. In the steady 
state, the discount factors of the two types are aligned at d, which is effec-
tively an average of the patience parameters Db and Ds. The steady-state 
debt ratios can be written in terms of b and q as follows:
d l(42)
2 1
, and
2 1
.( ) ( )=
θ
− β =
βθ
− β
The model can be parameterized directly with b and q rather than the 
two patience parameters Db and Ds (leaving a, l, and g– to be chosen sepa-
rately). The term b plays the usual role of the discount factor in a repre-
sentative-household economy given its relationship with the real interest 
rate (with an adjustment for steady-state real GDP growth). The term q 
quantifies the extent of heterogeneity between borrower and saver house-
holds, which is related to the amount of borrowing and saving that occurs 
in equilibrium, and hence to the debt-to-GDP ratio in equation 42. Given 
equation 40, q can be interpreted as the “debt service ratio” because it is 
the net fraction of income transferred by borrowers to savers. As will be 
seen, q is a sufficient statistic for the extent of heterogeneity in the econ-
omy, with q → 0 being the limiting case of a representative-household 
economy (Db → Ds).
Given that prices are sticky, attention is restricted to a zero-inflation 
steady state. Rather than specify the bond coupon parameter g directly, it is 
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convenient to set the steady-state fraction of debt that is not refinanced each 
period, denoted by µ. This fraction is µ = g/(1 + g–). Finally, a parameter 
restriction on the Frisch elasticities of borrowers and savers is imposed, 
which implies that the wealth distribution has no effect on aggregate labor 
supply (up to a first-order approximation):
(43) 1 1 , and 1 1 ,b s( ) ( ) ( ) ( )η = − θ η + θη η = + θ η − θη
where q is the steady-state debt service ratio defined in equation 40 and h 
is the effective aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply (it is assumed 
that h < 1/q).
III. Optimal Monetary Policy
This section studies the features of optimal monetary policy in the DSGE 
model with incomplete financial markets of section II. An exact analytical 
solution is not available in general, so this section resorts to finding the 
log-linear approximation of the optimal policy (the first-order perturbation 
around the nonstochastic steady state), which can be found analytically. 
The method is the familiar linear-quadratic approach whereby the appro-
priate welfare function is approximated up to second-order accuracy and is 
minimized subject to first-order accurate approximations of the equilibrium 
conditions, which act as the constraints on monetary policy. Derivations of 
all results are found in the appendix.
The notational convention below is that variables in a sans serif font 
(for example, d) denote log deviations of the equivalent variables in roman 
letters (for example, d) from their steady-state values (log deviations of 
interest rates, inflation rates, and growth rates are log deviations of the cor-
responding gross rates; for variables that have no steady state, the sans serif 
letter simply denotes the logarithm of that variable).
III.A. Constraints
Monetary policy analysis can be performed by studying just four endoge-
nous variables: the “debt gap” d~t, the inflation rate pt ≡ Pt - Pt-1, the  nominal 
bond yield jt, and the output gap Y
~
t. The debt gap d
~
t ≡ dt - d*t is the devia-
tion of the actual debt-to-GDP ratio dt from the “natural debt-to-GDP ratio” 
d*t, that is, the debt-to-GDP ratio that would prevail with complete financial 
markets (* signifies complete financial markets). The natural debt-to-GDP 
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ratio d*t is a multiple of the discounted sum of expectations of future real 
GDP growth gt = Yt - Yt−1:8


Et t t∑)(= − α β
=
∞
+(44) * 1 .
1
d g
With complete financial markets, the consumption of borrowers and savers 
would co-move perfectly with each other and with real GDP (their con-
sumption ratios would be c*b,t = 1 - q and c*s,t = 1 + q). Since the debt-to-
GDP ratio completely describes the distribution of financial wealth when 
there is a representative borrower and a representative saver, the debt gap d~t 
is a sufficient statistic for the deviation of the consumption allocation from 
the risk sharing provided by complete financial markets:
c d c dt t t t
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )= −
θ − βλ
− θ − β =
θ − βλ
+ θ − β(45)
1
1 1
~
, and 1
1 1
~
.b, s,
A positive debt gap corresponds with the consumption of savers growing 
faster than that of borrowers, and a negative debt gap corresponds with the 
consumption of savers growing more slowly than that of borrowers.
The output gap Y~t ≡ Yt - Ŷt is the deviation of the actual level of output 
Yt from the natural level of output Ŷt, that is, the level of output that would 
prevail with fully flexible prices (ˆ signifies flexible prices).9 The growth 
rate gˆt = Ŷt - Ŷt−1 of the natural level of output is:
( ) ˆ46
1 1
1 1
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+ +
+
+ +
+



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−
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α ξ ξ
η
,
which is a multiple of the exogenous growth rate of total factor productiv-
ity At as in the textbook New Keynesian model.
8. Note that the natural debt-to-GDP ratio is not independent of monetary policy when 
monetary policy is able to affect real GDP growth.
9. The assumption (equation 43) on the Frisch elasticities of borrowers and savers 
ensures that the level of output with flexible prices is independent of the wealth distribution, 
and thus the completeness of financial markets, up to a first-order approximation. The gen-
eral case is taken up in an earlier working paper (Sheedy 2014).
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There are three constraints on monetary policy imposed by the equilib-
rium conditions involving the debt gap d~t, inflation pt, the nominal bond 
yield jt, and the output gap Y
~
t:
E t t t(47) ~ ~ ;1 = λ+d d
j j
Y Y
d d r j j



E
E
t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
( )( ) ( )
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σ + εξ
− σ − σβ
ν ≡ α + ξ + + ξ
η
+ Y
These equations include one exogenous variable rˆ*t, which depends only 
on the exogenous growth rate gˆt of the natural level of output from equa-
tion 46:
( ) ˆ* ˆ ˆ ˆ50 1 1
0
r g g gt t t t t t= + −( ) −( )+ − +
=
α α β
 

E E
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Comparison with equation 44 shows that dˆ*t = rˆ*t - gˆt + b-1dˆ*t−1, where dˆ*t 
is the natural debt-to-GDP ratio when output is always at its natural level, 
hence the current natural debt-to-GDP ratio differs from its past value only 
because rˆ* differs from real GDP growth gˆt. Since debt repayments net of 
new borrowing must be zero to support risk sharing between borrowers 
and savers, this means that rˆ*t  can be interpreted as the real return on the 
complete-markets portfolio in the case where output is always equal to its 
natural level (the real return that ensures the actual debt-to-GDP ratio is 
always equal to the natural debt-to-GDP ratio when the output gap is zero).
The first constraint (equation 47) restricts the predictable component 
of the future debt gap Etd~t+1 to be a multiple l of the current debt gap. 
This is an implication of consumption smoothing. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
is a sufficient statistic for the wealth distribution in the economy, with a 
rise increasing the wealth of savers and decreasing the wealth of borrow-
ers. Households react to changes in financial wealth by smoothing out the 
response of consumption over time, which means any changes in financial 
330 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2014
wealth are persistent. This persistence is tempered by the marginal increas-
ing impatience of the Uzawa discount factors (equation 28) when l < 1, 
ensuring stationarity of d~t.
The second constraint (equation 48) determines the unpredictable com-
ponent of the debt gap d~t - Et−1d
~
t = d
~
t - ld
~
t−1. The first two terms on the left-
hand side are equal to the ex-post real return rt on nominal bonds between 
date t - 1 and t:
t
t t
t(51) 1 .
1
=
− βµ
− βµ − pi
−r
j j
In the case of short-term debt (µ = 0), this collapses to the usual ex-post 
Fisher equation rt = jt−1 - pt. With longer term debt (µ > 0), a rise in the 
current nominal yield jt reduces the real value of existing nominal assets 
or liabilities. Equation 48 shows that the unpredictable component of the 
debt gap d~t - Et−1 d
~
t depends positively on the difference between the actual 
ex-post real return on nominal bonds rt and the complete-markets-portfolio 
real return rˆ*t (assuming output is always at its natural level). Intuitively, if 
the actual real return is too high compared to the complete-markets port-
folio, the debt gap rises; the opposite happens if the real return is too low. 
The remaining terms in the middle of the left-hand side of equation 48 are 
present because the debt gap d~t is defined as the deviation of dt from d*t, 
that is, in terms of the natural debt-to-GDP ratio associated with the actual 
sequence of real GDP growth rates (which equation 45 shows is what is rel-
evant for risk sharing), rather than the hypothetical sequence of real GDP 
growth rates gˆt that would occur with flexible prices. These additional terms 
in equation 48 reflect the deviation of d*t from dˆ*t owing to price stickiness.
The third constraint (equation 49) is the standard New Keynesian Phil-
lips curve pt = bEtpt+1 + (n/k)Y~t relating current inflation to the output gap 
and expected future inflation. The coefficients in the Phillips curve are 
identical to those found in the textbook New Keynesian model (see Wood-
ford 2003).10 The elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to the output 
gap Y~t is n, and k captures the extent of nominal and real rigidities.
The textbook New Keynesian model comprises the Phillips curve equa-
tion 49 and an “IS curve,” where the IS curve is essentially a consumption 
Euler equation. Although the model here does not feature a representative 
10. If the assumption in equation 43 is relaxed then the debt gap d~t will appear in the 
Phillips curve. The consequences of this are taken up in an earlier working paper (Sheedy 
2014), but they are not found to be quantitatively important.
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household, it turns out that the usual IS curve is an implication of the two 
equations 47 and 48 together:11
t t t t t t
t t t
t t
t t t
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ρ = α
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+
+
+
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The term rt = Etrt+1 is the (ex-ante) real interest rate (the expected value 
of the real return rt on nominal bonds from equation 51). This reduces 
to rt = jt - Etpt+1 in the special case of short-term debt (µ = 0), which is 
what is assumed in the textbook New Keynesian model. The term rˆt is 
the natural real interest rate (the ex-ante interest rate that would prevail 
if prices were flexible, not to be confused with the ex-post real return rˆ*t 
that would prevail with complete financial markets), which also has an 
identical form to the textbook model. Note that the nominal yield jt is a 
weighted average of expectations of current and future sums of real interest 
rates and inflation rates:

 

Et t t t(53) 1 ,1
0
∑ [ ]( ) ( )= − βµ βµ ρ + pi+ + +
=
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j
where the weights on future expectations depend on b and the maturity 
parameter µ (the equation above uses the no-Ponzi condition in equation 
48, which is necessary to rule out bubbles when µ > 0 because bonds have 
no terminal date).12
An implication of equation 52 is that rt = a Et gt+1. Using this, the expres-
sion for the natural debt-to-GDP ratio in equation 44 can be given a more 
intuitive form:




Et t t t t(54) * 1 ,
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0 0
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
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which states that the natural debt-to-GDP ratio moves one-for-one with 
the ratio of the present discounted value of all current and future real GDP 
to current real GDP. Intuitively, financial wealth must co-move with the 
11. This is because the model has the feature that the marginal propensities to consume 
from financial wealth are the same for borrowers and savers up to a first-order approximation.
12. With both short-term and long-term bonds satisfying the expectations theory of 
 interest rates jt = (1 - bµ)Σ∞,=0 (bµ),Etit+, where it is the short-term interest rate, then the usual 
ex-ante Fisher equation it = rt + Etpt+1 would hold.
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present value of all nonfinancial income to support risk sharing between 
borrowers and savers; in other words, the complete-markets portfolio is an 
equity share in real GDP.
The three constraints in equations 47–49 leave one degree of freedom 
for monetary policy to affect the four endogenous variables. For simplic-
ity, monetary policy can be thought of as selecting a state-contingent path 
for the inflation rate pt or any other nominal variable such as nominal GDP 
growth. Given a path for the inflation rate pt, the Phillips curve (equation 
49) determines the output gap Y~t. The two equations (47 and 48) can then 
be solved for the debt gap d~t in terms of the inflation path and an exogenous 
shock ℘t that depends on the natural real GDP growth rate gˆt:
(55) ~ ~
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1 ,
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The next step in characterizing optimal monetary policy is to specify the 
objective function.
III.B. Objective Function
The objective function for monetary policy is taken to be the social wel-
fare function with Pareto weights that support the complete-markets con-
sumption allocation (meaning that the weights of borrowers and savers are 
proportional to (1 - q)a and (1 + q)a respectively). The social planner takes 
the discount factors (equation 28) as given, so there is no tension with the 
household decision problem where these discount factors were also taken 
as given. The welfare function is scaled by a function of initial output with 
flexible prices so that its units are percentage equivalents of initial output.
A second-order approximation of the welfare function (starting from 
date t0) around the nonstochastic steady state is given by the negative of 
the loss function,
 d Y∑ ( )
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where terms that are independent of monetary policy are ignored. The 
loss function includes the squared debt-to-GDP gap d~t, which is a suffi-
cient statistic for the welfare loss due to deviations from risk sharing. The 
coefficient is increasing in risk aversion a and the degree of heterogene-
ity between borrower and saver households as measured by q. Intuitively, 
greater risk aversion increases the importance of the risk sharing that is 
obtained from complete financial markets, while greater heterogeneity 
between households leads to larger financial positions of borrowers and 
savers, so a given percentage change in financial wealth has a larger impact 
on consumption.
The second term in the loss function (equation 56) is the squared infla-
tion rate, which is a sufficient statistic for the welfare loss due to rela-
tive-price distortions. This is a well-known property of Calvo pricing. The 
coefficient is increasing the price elasticity of demand e, the probability 
of price stickiness s, and the output elasticity of marginal cost x, which 
affects the degree of real rigidity in the economy. The third term in the loss 
function is the squared output gap. This represents the losses from aggre-
gate output and employment deviating from their efficient levels, and its 
coefficient is simply the elasticity n of real marginal cost with respect to 
the output gap. Both loss-function coefficients are identical to those found 
in the textbook New Keynesian model.
Optimal monetary policy minimizes the loss function (equation 56) sub-
ject to the constraints in equations 47–49. It is assumed that the central 
bank is able to commit to a policy and that this commitment has been made 
at some date t0 far in the past.13 The model developed here has essentially 
added one variable (the debt gap) and one equation to the textbook three-
equation and three-variable New Keynesian model; the extra variable also 
appears in the utility-based loss function. This provides a parsimonious 
and tractable framework for studying how the incompleteness of financial 
markets affects optimal monetary policy.
III.C. Special Case I: Complete Markets or a Representative Household
Suppose that the assumption that households can only buy or sell nomi-
nal bonds is changed to allow them access to complete financial markets. 
All other features of the model in section II are unchanged. In this version 
of the model, the value of contingent debt liabilities would always equal 
the natural debt-to-GDP ratio, so the debt gap d~t would always be zero. 
13. Time consistency issues and the discretionary policy equilibrium are studied in an 
earlier working paper (Sheedy 2014).
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Hence d~t = 0 replaces equation 48, and equation 47 automatically holds. 
It follows that the task of optimal monetary policy is to minimize only 
the inflation and output gap terms in the loss function (equation 56). 
Given the Phillips curve (equation 49) with its “divine coincidence” 
property that stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the out- 
put gap, optimal monetary policy is strict inflation targeting pt = 0. Since 
Y~t = 0 and d
~
t = 0 in this special case, the policy achieves a first-best allo-
cation of resources.
Alternatively, maintain the assumption of incomplete financial markets, 
but consider the special case of a representative household where the dif-
ference between households labeled ‘borrowers’ and those labeled ‘savers’ 
is eliminated. This difference is the degree of impatience represented by 
the parameters Db and Ds in equation 28. If Db = Ds, then equation 40 shows 
that this corresponds to a case where q = 0. The coefficient of the debt gap 
in the loss-function equation 56 is zero, so optimal monetary policy again 
needs only to minimize the inflation and output gap terms subject to the 
Phillips curve (equation 49). Strict inflation targeting is again optimal and 
results in a first-best allocation of resources, corresponding to the finding 
in the textbook New Keynesian model.
III.D. Special Case II: Fully Flexible Prices
Suppose goods prices are fully flexible, which means that s = 0 and 
hence k = 0 using equation 49. The coefficient of inflation in the loss func-
tion (equation 56) is zero in this case, because inflation does not lead to 
relative-price distortions. Furthermore, the Phillips curve (equation 49) 
implies the output gap is zero (Y~t = 0) irrespective of the behavior of infla-
tion. Consequently, the only concern of optimal monetary policy is to mini-
mize the first term involving the debt gap in the loss function (equation 
56). Since inflation affects the ex-post real return on nominal bonds (and 
thus the debt gap) through equation 48, it is feasible to obtain d~t = 0, which 
achieves a first-best allocation of resources.
Since inflation has a zero coefficient in the loss function (equation 56), 
there are generally many possible inflation paths equally consistent with 
d~t = 0 and thus the same zero value of the loss function. An inflation path 
must satisfy Σ∞,=0 (bµ), (Etpt+, - Et−1pt+,) + ℘t = 0, which follows from equa-
tion 55 with d~t = 0 and k = 0. With a zero output gap (gt = gˆt), the exogenous 
shock ℘t from equation 55 is:
( ) .57 1 1 1
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=
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The first part of this expression is news about the sequence of current and 
expected future real GDP growth rates Σ∞,=0 b,Etgt+, (discounting using the 
steady-state discount factor b). This captures any change in the antici-
pated stream of nonfinancial income that can be used by borrowers to 
service their debts.
Using the formula for the real interest rate rt = aEtgt+1, the second part of 
equation 57 is seen to be news about the sequence of current and expected 
future real interest rates Σ∞,=0 b,+1(1 - µ,+1)Etrt+,. An increase in this term is 
associated with a rise in the current or anticipated future cost of continu-
ing to borrow. The interest rate , periods ahead is multiplied not only by 
the discount factor b,+1 but also by 1 - µ,+1. The reason is that changes in 
(ex-ante) real interest rates affect borrowers only to the extent that existing 
debt is refinanced or new debt is issued, and the (steady-state) fraction of 
existing debt that remains un-refinanced , periods from now is µ,+1. Over-
all, the terms in equation 57 capture the shock to the stream of nonfinancial 
income, adjusted for any mitigating changes (when a < 1) or aggravating 
changes (when a > 1) in real interest rates triggered by this news.
Let Nt = Pt + Yt denote the level of (log) nominal GDP. Adopting the 
nominal GDP target below ensures that the debt gap is zero and therefore 
replicates complete financial markets:
t t(58) 11
*
.
( )
( )= −
− µ
− βµN d
Monetary policy should target a constant level of nominal GDP if the natu-
ral debt-to-GDP ratio d*t is constant; and, if the natural debt-to-GDP ratio 
changes, the target for the level of nominal GDP should be adjusted in the 
opposite direction. In the case of short-term debt (µ = 0), this target reduces 
simply to Nt = -d*t, so the nominal GDP target should move one-for-one 
in the opposite direction to the natural debt-to-GDP ratio. Intuitively, if the 
nominal value of debt liabilities is completely predetermined (as it is with 
one-period debt), the debt-to-GDP ratio should be adjusted to the natu-
ral debt-to-GDP ratio by having the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
(nominal GDP) move inversely with the natural debt-to-GDP ratio. With 
longer-maturity debt (µ > 0), the nominal GDP target does not need to 
adjust as much to changes in the natural debt-to-GDP ratio.
Equation 58 shows that a constant nominal GDP target is optimal when 
either the natural debt-to-GDP ratio d*t is constant, or when debt has a 
sufficiently long maturity so that no refinancing is necessary (µ = 1). To 
understand this, first consider the special case where real GDP follows a 
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random walk, so that real GDP growth gt is an i.i.d. stochastic process, with 
equation 44 implying that d*t = 0. Equation 57 shows that the exogenous 
shock ℘t is simply equal to current real GDP growth gt in this case. Fol-
lowing a constant nominal GDP target implies pt = -gt, which means the 
inflation rate is also serially uncorrelated. The term Σ∞,=0(bµ),Etpt+, reduces 
to pt, which confirms (using equation 55) that the nominal GDP target 
Nt = 0 is optimal.
Intuitively, if shocks to real GDP are permanent, the current percent-
age change in real GDP is equal to the percentage change in the present 
discounted value of all current and future real GDP. (There is no change 
in ex-ante real interest rates because consumption smoothing calls for 
an equal-sized adjustment of consumption, as confirmed by the equation 
rt = aEtgt+1.) A constant nominal GDP target moves the price level unex-
pectedly in the opposite direction to real GDP, which changes the real value 
of all nominal debt liabilities (of whatever maturity) by the same percent-
age as the stream of real nonfinancial income, which is what is required for 
risk sharing.
With different dynamics of real GDP, current real GDP growth is not 
the same as the percentage change in the present discounted value of the 
stream of nonfinancial income. Now consider the case where utility is 
 logarithmic in consumption (a = 1), where equation 57 implies ℘t = Σ∞,=0 
(bµ), (Etgt+, - Et−1gt+,). Since a constant nominal GDP target means pt = -gt, 
the innovation to Σ∞,=0 (bµ), Etpt+, is equal to -℘t, so the policy succeeds in 
replicating complete financial markets.
To understand the intuition, suppose all debt is refinanced each period, 
where only unexpected inflation leads to a change in the real value of exist-
ing debt (though the argument applies to any maturity of debt). The nomi-
nal GDP target ensures that any surprise change in current real GDP will 
be matched by an equal percentage change in the real value of debt. How-
ever, changes in current real GDP are not necessarily an accurate reflection 
of changes in the value of the stream of current and future nonfinancial 
income, which is what ultimately matters for the ability of borrowers to 
service their debts. For example, an expected recovery of real GDP follow-
ing an initial negative shock means that the loss of current income over-
states the fall in the present discounted value of current and future real 
GDP. However, such predictable variation in real GDP growth rates also 
leads to changes in ex-ante real interest rates, with an expected rise in real 
GDP increasing interest rates. In the example of the expected recovery, the 
position of borrowers is worsened by the higher interest rates because they 
must refinance their debts.
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With logarithmic utility, the percentage-point change in the real interest 
rate is equal to the percentage-point change in expected real GDP growth, 
so with an expected recovery the higher real interest rate exactly cancels 
out the benefit of the higher income anticipated in the future. A constant 
nominal GDP target is optimal because the required adjustment of the real 
value of debts for risk sharing is, therefore, simply equal to the unexpected 
change in current real GDP. This argument applies more generally for any 
maturity parameter µ when utility is logarithmic. The longer the maturity of 
debt, the less impact changes in real interest rates will have on borrowers, 
because there is less refinancing, but the greater the effect of predictable 
inflation on the real value of existing debt. These two forces exactly cancel 
each other out with logarithmic utility, and a constant nominal GDP target 
remains optimal.
In the special case of very long maturity debt that requires no refinanc-
ing (µ = 1), observe that the shock ℘t in equation 57 reduces to ℘t = Σ∞,=0 
b,(Etgt+, - Et−1gt+,). Unsurprisingly, the terms related to changes in ex-ante 
real interest rates are absent, because there is no refinancing risk for bor-
rowers. With µ = 1, Σ∞,=0 (bµ), Etpt+, = Σ∞,=0 b, Etpt+,, so a constant nominal 
GDP target that implies pt = -gt succeeds in achieving d
~
t = 0.
Intuitively, given debt’s long maturity, both predictable and unpredict-
able inflation have exactly the same effect on its real value. Hence, in the 
absence of refinancing risk, whatever the dynamics of real GDP are, infla-
tion movements in the opposite direction that mirror real GDP growth 
ensure that the real value of debt moves one-for-one with the present dis-
counted value of the stream of nonfinancial income. More generally, for 
0 < µ < 1, the longer the maturity of debt, the less important is refinancing 
risk, and the smaller the difference between the effects of unpredictable 
and predictable inflation on the real value of debt. When real GDP dis-
plays predictable dynamics, it is these two factors that explain why the 
nominal GDP target (equation 58) needs to move with the natural debt-
to-GDP ratio, and thus why the adjustment of the target is smaller when 
µ is larger.
As discussed, when µ > 0, the optimal monetary policy is not unique 
because many different inflation paths can lead to the same real value 
of debt. Rather than a nominal GDP target (equation 58) that adjusts to 
changes in the natural debt-to-GDP ratio, it is often possible to find a time-
invariant weighted nominal GDP target Nw,t ≡ Pt + wYt = 0 that achieves the 
same outcome for some relative weight w on real GDP. If real GDP growth 
is a stationary and invertible stochastic process that can be expressed as gt = 
Σ∞,=0 J,et−, for a white-noise shock et and a sequence of coefficients {J,} 
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then the following monetary policy will also replicate complete financial 
markets:
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Note that w* is equal to one (an unweighted nominal GDP target) in any of 
the special cases discussed above (namely, J, = 0 for all , ≥ 1, or a = 1, or 
µ = 1). It might be tempting to interpret equation 59 as a form of flexible 
inflation targeting, but it is important to note that Yt is the level of real GDP, 
not the output gap. It is crucial that the measure of real GDP in equation 59 
is not corrected for any changes in potential output.
III.E. Special Case III: Sticky Prices and Inelastic Labor Supply
With a zero Frisch elasticity of labor supply (h = 0), equation 49 shows 
that n → ∞ (n is the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to the 
output gap). The Phillips curve (equation 49) then implies that the output 
gap must be zero (Y~t = 0) even though prices are sticky. While the coef-
ficient of the output gap in the loss function (equation 56) becomes large, 
the product of this with the squared output gap tends to zero. Thus, optimal 
monetary policy is concerned only with the first two terms in the loss func-
tion (equation 56), the debt gap d~t and the inflation rate pt. However, there 
is a trade-off when stabilizing these variables because inflation that affects 
the real value of debt now leads to relative price distortions because prices 
are sticky. The optimal monetary policy subject to this trade-off is:
d dt t t t t t( ) ( )= λ − − χ ℘ pi = µpi − χ − βµ ℘− −(60) ~ ~ 1 , and 1 ,1 1 2
where
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1 1 1
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αθ − σ − βσ − βλ
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
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and where ℘t is as given in equation 57. With sticky prices, replicating 
complete financial markets through variation in inflation is costly, so the 
central bank tolerates some deviation from full risk sharing. To the extent 
that c in equation 61 is less than one, a shock ℘t leads to fluctuations in 
the debt gap d~t. These fluctuations are persistent (the debt gap is an AR(1) 
process) because of the constraint in equation 47: the serial correlation of 
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the debt gap must be l. Once a nonzero debt gap arises at time t, because 
of consumption smoothing there is no predictable future policy action that 
can undo its future consequences.
Equation 60 shows that if c were equal to 1, the debt gap would be com-
pletely stabilized, and if c were 0, inflation would be completely stabilized. 
Since 0 < c < 1, optimal monetary policy can be interpreted as a mixture of 
strict inflation targeting and a policy that replicates complete financial mar-
kets. As the responses of d~t and pt to the shock ℘t are linearly related to c, the 
terms c and 1 - c can be interpreted respectively as the weights on support-
ing risk sharing and avoiding relative-price distortions. Comparing equations 
56 and 61, it can be seen that c is positively related to the ratio of the coef-
ficients of d~2t and p2t in the loss function divided by (1 - bl2) and (1 - bµ2).
Greater risk aversion (a) or more heterogeneity (q) and hence more bor-
rowing increase the coefficient of d~2t and thus c; a larger price elasticity 
of demand (e), stickier prices (s), or more real rigidities (x) increase the 
coefficient of p2t and thus reduce c. The optimal trade-off is also affected 
by the constraints in equations 47 and 48, which explains the presence of 
the terms (1 - bl2) and (1 - bµ2) in the formula for c. A greater value of 
l increases the persistence of the debt gap, which makes fluctuations in d~t 
significantly more costly than suggested by the loss function coefficient 
alone. The parameter µ affects the link between bond yields and the debt 
gap. It is evident that an increase in µ leads to a higher value of c, the intu-
ition for which is related to the optimal behavior of inflation. Finally, note 
that while the optimal policy responses depend on the stochastic process 
for real GDP growth (which determines the shock ℘t according to equa-
tion 57), the optimal weight c does not.
Equation 60 shows that optimal monetary policy features inflation per-
sistence (the optimal behavior of inflation is an AR(1) process). The opti-
mal serial correlation is given by the debt maturity parameter µ, which is 
the steady-state fraction of un-refinanced debt in each time period. The 
result is that inflation should return to its average value at the same rate 
at which debt is refinanced. At the extremes, one-period debt (µ = 0) cor-
responds to serially uncorrelated inflation, while perpetuities (g = 1, for 
which µ ≈ 1) correspond to near random-walk persistence of inflation.
To understand this, note that with one-period debt, the current bond 
yield jt disappears from the constraint (equation 48); thus, the only way that 
policy can affect d~t is through an unexpected change in current inflation. 
With longer-maturity debt, the range of policy options increases. Changes 
in current bond yields jt are also relevant in addition to current inflation, and 
the bond yield is affected by expectations of future inflation (equation 53). 
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This can be seen from equation 55 where the sum Σ∞,=0 (bµ), (Etpt+, - Et−1pt+,) 
affects the debt gap, with µ, being the fraction of existing debt that will 
not have been refinanced after , time periods. It is possible to use inflation 
that is spread out over time to influence the debt gap when µ > 0, not only 
inflation surprises.
Furthermore, this ‘inflation smoothing’ is optimal because the welfare 
costs of inflation are convex (inflation appears in the loss function [equa-
tion 56] as p2t), so the costs of a given cumulated amount of inflation are 
smaller when spread out over a number of quarters or years than when all 
the inflation occurs in just one quarter. This is analogous to the “tax smooth-
ing” argument of Barro (1979). Interestingly, the argument shows that 
high degrees of inflation persistence need not be interpreted as a failure of 
policy. In contrast with the tax smoothing analysis, it is generally not opti-
mal for inflation to display random-walk or near-random-walk persistence 
unless debt contracts are close to perpetuities. As the maturity parameter µ 
is reduced and thus bµ falls significantly below one, expectations of infla-
tion far in the future have a smaller effect on bond yields than inflation in 
the near future. The further in the future inflation is expected to occur, the 
less effective it is at influencing real returns and thus the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Even if optimal monetary policy places a substantial weight c on risk 
sharing compared to relative-price distortions, in what sense does mon-
etary policy still resemble a nominal GDP target? It turns out that optimal 
monetary policy retains the essential feature of nominal GDP targeting in 
generating a negative co-movement between prices and output. However, 
because of the desire to smooth inflation, the central bank should not gen-
erally aim to stabilize nominal GDP (or a weighted measure of nominal 
GDP) exactly on a quarter-by-quarter basis. Instead, optimal policy can be 
formulated as a long-run target for weighted nominal GDP together with 
the inflation smoothing rule Etpt+1 = µpt implied by equation 60. When 
real GDP is nonstationary, optimal monetary policy features cointegration 
between the price level and output. If real GDP growth is the stationary and 
invertible stochastic process gt = Σ
∞
,=0 J,et−,, then
P Y
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with w* as given in equation 59. This cointegrating relationship can be 
interpreted as a long-run target for weighted nominal GDP, because there is 
some linear combination of the price level and real output that is invariant 
to shocks in the long run.
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III.F. The General Case
In the general case where labor supply is elastic (h > 0), monetary policy 
can also affect the output gap Y~t through the Phillips curve (equation 49), 
and the ex-ante real interest rate rt through the IS curve in equation 52 
(implied by equations 47 and 48). This is important not only because of 
a concern for stabilizing the output gap, given that it appears in the loss 
function (equation 56), but also because the output gap affects the debt gap 
d~t through the constraint (equation 48). The IS curve (equation 52) implies 
that the output gap and the ex-ante real interest rate rt are linked by rt = 
aEt Y
~
t+1 - aY
~
t + rˆt, where rˆt is the natural real interest rate. The coefficient 
a of the output gap in this equation is the source of the coefficient a of Y~t 
in equation 48.
The solution to the optimal monetary policy problem in the general 
case is:
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As before, the debt gap d~t is described by the AR(1) process in equation 
63 with autoregressive root l. The response to the shock ℘t (from equa-
tion 55) is scaled by 1 - c, where c in equation 64 is a number between 
zero and one that indicates the extent to which monetary policy replicates 
full risk sharing. Inflation pt is now the ARMA(2,1) process in equation 65 
with autoregressive roots µ (as before) and  (satisfying 0 <  < 1), and a 
positive moving-average root. The response of inflation to the shock ℘t is 
scaled by c, where a value of c of one indicates the inflation response that 
would replicate complete financial markets.
To understand the new aspects of the optimal monetary policy problem 
with elastic labor supply, note that policy can now influence three variables 
that have implications for the debt gap and thus the extent to which mon-
etary policy supports risk sharing: inflation, the ex-ante real interest rate, 
and real GDP. Inflation affects the ex-post real return on nominal bonds and 
thus the value of existing debt, as described earlier. The ex-ante real inter-
est rate affects the ongoing costs of servicing debt relative to the stream 
of current and future labor income (formally, the ex-ante real interest rate 
influences the debt gap by changing the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio con-
sistent with risk sharing). Real GDP (and hence the output gap) affects the 
denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In the solution for the debt gap d~t in 
equation 55, these three channels correspond to the three terms appearing 
after the shock ℘t.
An increase in the output gap Y~t has the effect of directly boosting real 
GDP growth at time t and thus reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, but the 
impact on the debt gap d~t is more subtle. Since monetary policy has only 
a temporary influence on real GDP, extra growth now reduces overall 
growth in the future by exactly the same amount. Given the link between 
growth expectations and the debt-to-GDP ratio consistent with risk shar-
ing (the natural debt-to-GDP ratio d*t in equation 54), the effect of the 
output gap on the debt gap actually depends on Y~t + Et[b(Y~t+1 - Y~t) + 
b2 (Y~t+2 - Y~t+1) + . . .], not only on Y~t. With the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve (equation 49), it is seen that this term is equal to (1 - b) (k/n) pt, 
the reciprocal of the long-run Phillips curve slope multiplied by current 
inflation, which explains the final term in equation 55. Since it is reason-
able to assume the discount factor b is close to one, this term is negligible 
for all practical purposes; it is not exactly zero because future growth 
is discounted relative to current growth, so by bringing growth forward, 
there is still a small positive effect. Monetary policy therefore cannot have 
a sustainable impact on the burden of debt simply through its temporary 
effect on the level of real GDP.
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However, it does not follow that expansionary or contractionary mon-
etary policy has no effect on the debt burden beyond its implications for 
ex-post real returns through inflation. There remains the option of changing 
ex-ante real interest rates. Intuitively, expansionary monetary policy that 
reduces the ex-ante real interest rate is effectively a transfer from savers to 
borrowers, what might be labeled “financial repression,” even though the 
means by which monetary policy affects real interest rates is no different 
from the textbook New Keynesian model.
Changing ex-ante real interest rates thus provides monetary policy with 
an alternative to influencing the debt gap through the effect of inflation on 
ex-post real returns. In contrast to the latter, which is effective only while 
debt contracts are not refinanced, the former is effective only when refi-
nancing does take place. For debt refinanced , periods after a shock at time 
t, the impact of monetary policy on the date-t debt burden is determined 
by the discounted sum of real interest gaps Et[b,+1r∼t+, + b,+2r∼t+,+1 + b,+3r∼t+,+2 
+ . . .] from t + , onwards, where r∼t ≡ rt - rˆt. Given the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve (equation 49) and r∼t = aEt [Y~t+1 - Y~t] implied by the IS curve 
(equation 52), these terms reduce to (ak/n)b,+1Et[pt+,+1 - pt+,]. This formula 
reveals that the gradient of the inflation path over time is an indicator of 
financial repression through ex-ante real interest rates, in contrast to the 
level of inflation that matters for the ex-post real return. With a (steady-
state) fraction (1 - µ)µ, of debt issued prior to date t being refinanced 
at t + ,, the overall effect of changes in ex-ante real interest rates on the 
debt burden is given by the unexpected change in (ak/n)(1 - µ)b Σ∞,=0 (bµ), 
Et[pt+,+1 - pt+,], which explains the penultimate term in equation 55.
This analysis shows that the more the inflation trajectory is smoothed, 
the smaller is the effect of monetary policy on ex-ante real interest rates, 
and the longer the maturity of debt, the less impact ex-ante real interest rate 
changes have on the debt gap. As has been seen earlier, when the maturity 
of debt increases, a policy of smoothing out changes in inflation is increas-
ingly effective at influencing the ex-post real return on nominal debt at a 
low welfare cost in terms of relative price distortions (the Phillips curve 
in equation 49 implies that inflation smoothing also helps reduce output 
gap fluctuations). Significant financial repression will not be optimal with 
long-maturity debt, because it would require an inflation trajectory with a 
nonzero slope further in the future. Given the Phillips curve, the required 
inflation path would entail output gap fluctuations over a longer horizon, 
increasing the losses from following such a policy. But for short-maturity 
debt, where only immediate inflation surprises can affect ex-post real 
returns, which are much more costly than smoothed-out inflation, financial 
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repression provides an additional tool for stabilizing the debt gap, with the 
losses from following this policy being small when the short-run Phillips 
curve is relatively flat.
IV. Quantitative Analysis of Optimal Monetary Policy
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the nature of the optimal 
monetary policy characterized in section III.
IV.A. Calibration
Let T denote the length in years of one discrete time period in the model. 
The numerical results presented here assume a quarterly frequency (T = ¼). 
The parameters of the model are b, q, a, l, h, µ, e, x, and s. As far as pos-
sible, these parameters are set to match features of U.S. data.14 The baseline 
calibration targets and the implied parameter values are given in table 1 and 
justified below.
Consider first the parameters b and q (equations 40 and 41 show that 
the choice of these parameters is equivalent to specifying the patience 
14. All the data referred to below were obtained from Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2).
Table 1. Baseline Calibration: Targets and Parameter values
Calibration targetsa Implied parameter valuesb
Real GDP growth g 1.7%
Real interest rate r 5% Discount factor b 0.992
Debt-to-GDP ratio D 130% Debt service ratio q 8.6%
Coefficient of relative risk 
aversion
a 5
Marginal propensity to consume m 6% Discount factor elasticity l 0.993
Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply
h 2
Average duration of debt Tm 5 Debt maturity parameter µ 0.967
Price elasticity of demand e 3
Marginal cost elasticity w.r.t. 
output
x 0.5
Average duration of price 
stickiness
Tp 8/12 Calvo pricing parameter s 0.625
Sources: See discussion in section IV.A.
a. The calibration targets are specified in annual time units; the parameter values assume a quarterly 
model (T = ¼).
b. The parameters are derived from the calibration targets using equations 66–70.
Kevin D. SheeDy 345
parameters Db and Ds). These parameters are calibrated to match evidence 
on the average price and quantity of household debt. The “price” of debt 
is the average annual continuously compounded real interest rate r paid 
by households for loans. As seen in equation 41, the steady-state growth-
adjusted real interest rate is related to b. Let g denote the average annual 
real growth rate of the economy. Given the length of the discrete time 
period in the model, 1 + r– = erT and 1 + g– = egT. Hence, using equation 41, 
b can be set thus:
Tβ = ( )− −r g(66) e .
From 1972 through 2011 there were average annual nominal interest rates 
of 8.8 percent on 30-year mortgages, 10 percent on 4-year auto loans, and 
13.7 percent on 2-year personal loans, while the average annual change in 
the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index over the same 
period was 3.8 percent. The average credit-card interest rate between 1995 
and 2011 was 14 percent. For comparison, 30-year Treasury bonds had an 
average yield of 7.7 percent over the periods 1977–2001 and 2006–11. The 
implied real interest rates are 4.2 percent on Treasury bonds, 5 percent on 
mortgages, 6.2 percent on auto loans, 9.9 percent on personal loans, and 
12 percent on credit cards. The baseline real interest rate is set to the 5 per-
cent rate on mortgages, since these constitute the bulk of household debt. 
The sensitivity analysis considers values of r from 4 percent up to 7 percent. 
Over the period 1972–2011, used to calibrate the interest rate, the average 
annual growth rate of real GDP per capita was 1.7 percent. Together with 
the baseline real interest rate of 5 percent, this implies that b ≈ 0.992 using 
equation 66. Since many models used for monetary policy analysis are typi-
cally calibrated assuming zero real trend growth, for comparison the sensi-
tivity analysis also considers values of g between 0 percent and 2 percent.
The relevant quantity variable for debt is the ratio of gross household 
debt to annual household income, denoted by D. This corresponds to what 
is defined as the loans-to-GDP ratio l– in the model (the empirical debt 
ratio being based on the amount borrowed rather than the subsequent 
value of loans at maturity) after adjusting for the length of one time period 
(T years), hence D = l–T. Using the expression for l– in equation 42 and 
given a value of b, the equation can be solved for the implied value of the 
debt service ratio q:
D
T
( )θ = − ββ(67)
2 1
.
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Note that in the model, all GDP is consumed, so for consistency between 
the data and the model’s prediction for the debt-to-GDP ratio, either the 
numerator of the ratio should be total gross debt (not only household debt), 
or the denominator should be disposable personal income or private con-
sumption. Since the model is designed to represent household borrowing, 
and because the implications of corporate and government debt may be 
different, the latter approach is taken.
In the United States, as in a number of other countries, the ratio of 
household debt to income has grown significantly in recent decades. To 
focus on the implications of the levels of debt recently experienced, the 
model is calibrated to match average debt ratios during the five years from 
2006 to 2010. The sensitivity analysis considers a wide range of possible 
debt ratios from 0 percent up to 200 percent. Over the period 2006–10, the 
average ratio of gross household debt to disposable personal income was 
approximately 124 percent, while the ratio of debt to private consumption 
was approximately 135 percent. Taking the average of these numbers, the 
target chosen is a model-consistent debt-to-income ratio of 130 percent, 
which implies (using equation 67) a debt service ratio of q ≈ 8.6 percent.
For the coefficient of relative risk aversion a, the survey evidence pre-
sented by Barsky and others (1997) suggests considerable risk aversion, but 
most likely not in the high double-digit range for the majority of individu-
als. Overall, the weight of evidence from this and other studies suggests a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion above one, but not significantly higher 
than 10. A conservative baseline value of 5 is adopted, and the sensitivity 
analysis considers values from zero up to 10.
One approach to calibrating the discount factor elasticity parameter l 
(from equation 28) is to select a value on the basis of its implications for 
the marginal propensity to consume from financial wealth. Let m denote 
the increase in per-household (annual) consumption of savers from a mar-
ginal increase in their financial wealth. It can be shown that m, l, and b are 
related as follows:
mλ = −β
T(68) 1 .
Parker (1999) presents evidence to suggest that the marginal propensity to 
consume from wealth lies between 4 and 5 percent (for a survey of the liter-
ature on wealth and consumption, see Poterba 2000). However, it is argued 
by Juster and others (2006) that the marginal propensity to consume varies 
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between different forms of wealth. They find that the marginal propensity 
to consume is lowest for housing wealth and larger for financial wealth. 
Given the focus on financial wealth in this paper, the baseline  calibration 
assumes m ≈ 6 percent, which using equation 68 implies l ≈ 0.993. The 
sensitivity analysis considers marginal propensities to consume from 4 to 
8 percent.
The range of available evidence on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply 
h is discussed by Hall (2009), who concludes that a value of approxi-
mately 2⁄3 is reasonable. However, both real business cycle and New 
Keynesian models have typically assumed Frisch elasticities significantly 
larger than this, often as high as 4 (see King and Rebelo 1999; Rotemberg 
and Woodford 1997). The baseline calibration adopted here uses a Frisch 
elasticity of 2, and the sensitivity analysis considers a range of values for 
h from completely inelastic labor supply up to 4. With the assumption 
(equation 43) on the differences between the Frisch elasticities of borrow-
ers and savers that ensures the wealth distribution has no impact on the 
aggregate supply of labor, the baseline calibration amounts to setting hb ≈ 
1.6 and hs ≈ 2.6.
The debt maturity parameter µ (which given µ = g/(1 + n–) stands in 
for the parameter g specifying the sequence of coupon payments) is set to 
match the average maturity of household debt contracts. In the model, the 
average maturity of household debt is related to the duration of the bond 
that is traded in incomplete financial markets. Formally, duration Tm refers 
to the average of the maturities (in years) of each payment made by the 
bond weighted by its contribution to the present value of the bond. Given 
the geometric sequence of nominal coupon payments parameterized by g, 
the bond duration (in steady state) is
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Let j denote the average annualized nominal interest rate on household 
debt, with 1 + j– = ejT. In the optimal policy analysis, the steady-state rate of 
inflation is zero (p– = 0), hence nominal GDP growth is n– = g–, and so µ = g/
(1 + g–). It follows that g and µ can be determined by
gγ = −

 µ = γ−
T
T
jT T(69) e 1 , and e .
m
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Doepke and Schneider (2006) present evidence on the average duration of 
household nominal debt liabilities. Their analysis takes account of refinanc-
ing and prepayment of loans. For the most recent year in their data (2004), 
the duration lies between 5 and 6 years, and the duration has not been less 
than 4 years over the entire period covered by the study (1952–2004). This 
suggests a baseline duration of Tm ≈ 5 years, which using equation 69 implies 
µ ≈ 0.967. The sensitivity analysis considers the effects of having durations 
as short as one quarter (one-period debt) and as long as 10 years.
There are two main strategies for calibrating the price elasticity of demand 
e. The direct approach draws on studies estimating consumer responses to 
price differences within narrow consumption categories. A price elasticity of 
approximately 3 is typical of estimates at the retail level (see, for example, 
Nevo 2001), while estimates of consumer substitution across broad con-
sumption categories suggest much lower price elasticities, typically lower 
than one (Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber 1993). Indirect approaches esti-
mate the price elasticity based on the implied markup 1/(e - 1), or as part of 
the estimation of a DSGE model. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate 
an elasticity of approximately 7.9 and point out this is consistent with mark-
ups in the range of 10 to 20 percent. Since it is the price elasticity of demand 
that directly matters for the welfare consequences of inflation rather than 
its implications for markups as such, the direct approach is preferred here 
and the baseline value of e is set to 3. A range of values is considered in the 
sensitivity analysis, from the theoretical minimum elasticity of 1 up to 10.
The production function is given in equation 32. If e denotes the elas-
ticity of aggregate output with respect to hours, then the elasticity x of 
real marginal cost with respect to output can be obtained from e using 
x = (1 - e)/e. A conventional value of e ≈ 2⁄3 is adopted for the baseline 
calibration (this would be the labor share in a model with perfect com-
petition), which implies x ≈ 0.5. An important implication of x is the 
strength of real rigidities, which are absent in the special case of a linear 
production function (x = 0). The sensitivity analysis considers values of 
x between 0 and 1.
In the model, s is the probability of not changing price in a given time 
period. The probability distribution of survival times for newly set prices 
is (1 - s)s,, and hence the expected duration of a price spell Tp (in years) 
is Tp = T Σ∞,=1 ,(1 - s)s,-1 = T/(1 - s). With data on Tp, the parameter s can 
be inferred from:
T
T
σ = −(70) 1 .
p
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Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), the baseline duration of a 
price spell is taken to be 8 months (Tp ≈ 8/12), implying s ≈ 0.625. The 
sensitivity analysis considers average durations from 3 to 15 months.
IV.B. Results
Consider an economy hit by an unexpected permanent fall in potential 
output. How should monetary policy react? In the basic New Keynes-
ian model with sticky prices but either complete financial markets or 
a representative household, the optimal monetary policy response to a 
total-factor-productivity shock is to keep inflation on target and allow 
actual output to fall in line with the loss of potential output. Using the 
baseline calibration from table 1 and the solution (equations 63–65) 
to the optimal monetary policy problem, figure 1 shows the impulse 
responses of the debt-to-GDP gap d~t, inflation pt, the output gap Y
~
t, and 
the bond yield jt under the optimal monetary policy and under a policy 
of strict inflation targeting for the 30 years following a 10 percent fall 
in potential output.
With strict inflation targeting, the debt-to-GDP gap rises in line with 
the fall in output (10 percent) because the denominator of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio falls while the numerator is unchanged. The effects of this shock on 
the wealth distribution and hence on consumption are long lasting. The 
serial correlation of the debt gap is equal to l ≈ 0.993, implying an average 
duration of approximately 36 years. Intuitively, with a marginal propen-
sity to consume from financial wealth of 6 percent per year, consumption 
smoothing leads to persistence in the wealth distribution for far longer than 
typical business-cycle frequencies. Strict inflation targeting does ensure 
that the output gap is completely stabilized (the “divine coincidence”), and 
with no change in real interest rates or inflation, bond yields are completely 
unaffected.
The optimal monetary policy response is in complete contrast to strict 
inflation targeting. Optimal policy allows inflation to rise, which stabilizes 
nominal GDP over time in spite of the fall in real GDP. This helps to sta-
bilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, moving the economy closer to the outcome 
with complete financial markets where borrowers would be insured against 
the shock and the value of debt liabilities would automatically move in 
line with income. The rise in the debt-to-GDP gap is very small (around 
1 percent) compared to strict inflation targeting (10 percent). The rise in 
inflation is very persistent, lasting around two decades. The higher inflation 
called for is significant, but not dramatic: for the first two years, it is around 
2–3 percentage points higher (at an annualized rate), for the next decade 
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around 1–2 percent higher, and for the decade after that, around 0–1 per-
cent higher. The serial correlation of inflation is due almost entirely to the 
autoregressive root µ ≈ 0.967 (the other autoregressive root is  ≈ 0.29, 
and the moving-average root is 0.41, which are much smaller and not far 
from canceling out as a common factor). The average duration of inflation 
is approximately 7 years, which is longer than typical business-cycle fre-
quencies. Inflation that is spread out over time is still effective in reducing 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The shock is an unexpected permanent TFP shock that reduces the natural level of output by 10% 
relative to its trend. The parameters are set in accordance with the baseline calibration from table 1.
b. The debt-to-GDP gap and the output gap are reported as percentage deviations.
c. Inflation and bond yields are reported as annualized percentage rates. 
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Figure 1. Responses to a TFP Shock, Optimal Monetary Policy vs. Strict  
inflation Targetinga
Kevin D. SheeDy 351
the debt-to-GDP ratio because debt liabilities have a long average maturity. 
It is also significantly less costly in terms of relative-price distortions to 
have inflation spread out over a longer time than the typical durations of 
stickiness of individual prices: this is the inflation-smoothing argument that 
drives the optimality of the autoregressive root µ.
The rise in inflation does affect the output gap for the first one or two 
years, but this is short-lived because the duration of the real effects of mon-
etary policy through the traditional price-stickiness channel is brief com-
pared to the relevant time scale of decades for the other variables. The 
effect is also quantitatively small because inflation is highly persistent, the 
rise in expected inflation closely following the rise in actual inflation, 
so the Phillips curve implies little impact on the output gap. Finally, nomi-
nal bond yields show a persistent increase. It might seem surprising that 
yields do not fall as monetary policy is loosened, but the bonds in question 
are long-term bonds, and the effect on inflation expectations is dominant 
(there is a small fall in real interest rates because the rise in bond yields is 
less than what is implied by the higher expected inflation, but there is no 
significant “financial repression” effect).
The term c from equation 64 provides a precise measure of the relative 
importance of risk sharing versus inflation stabilization under the optimal 
monetary policy (the response of the debt gap is a multiple 1 - c of what 
it would be under strict inflation targeting, while the response of inflation 
is a multiple c of what it would need to be to support full risk sharing). 
The baseline calibration leads to a policy weight c on debt gap stabiliza-
tion of approximately 89 percent and a policy weight 1 - c on inflation 
stabilization of 11 percent.
The baseline calibration thus implies that addressing the problem of 
incomplete financial markets is quantitatively the main focus of optimal 
monetary policy rather than other objectives such as inflation stabilization. 
What explains this, and how sensitive is this conclusion to the particular 
calibration targets? Consider the exercise of varying each calibration target 
individually over the ranges discussed in section IV.A, holding all other tar-
gets constant. For each new target, the implied parameters are recalculated 
and the new policy weight c is obtained. Figure 2 plots the values of c (the 
optimal policy weight on risk sharing) obtained for each target.
As can be seen in figure 2, over the range of reasonable average real GDP 
growth rates and real interest rates there is almost no effect on the opti-
mal policy weight. The results are most sensitive to the calibration targets 
for the average debt-to-GDP ratio and the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion. The average debt-to-GDP ratio proxies for the parameter q, which is 
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Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The response of the debt gap under the optimal policy is 1 – χ multiplied by its response under strict 
inflation targeting. Each of the calibration targets in table 1 is varied individually, holding all others at 
their baseline values. The baseline value of χ is 0.89. 
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related to the difference in patience between borrowers and savers. It is not 
surprising that an economy with less debt in relation to income has less of 
a concern with the incompleteness of financial markets, because in such 
a case the impact of shocks is felt more evenly by borrowers and savers. 
In the limiting case of a representative-household economy, the average 
debt-to-GDP ratio tends to zero, and the degree of completeness of finan-
cial markets becomes irrelevant. Risk sharing receives more than half the 
weight in the optimal policy as long as the calibration target for the average 
debt-to-GDP ratio is not below 50 percent.
It is also not surprising that the results are sensitive to the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. Since the only use for complete financial markets in 
the model is risk sharing, if households were risk-neutral then there would 
be no loss from these markets being absent, as long as saving and bor-
rowing remained possible in incomplete financial markets. The baseline 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher than the typical value of 
2 found in many macroeconomic models (although that number is usually 
relevant for intertemporal substitution in those models, not for attitudes 
to risk), but it is low compared to the values often assumed in finance 
models that seek to match risk premia. The optimal policy weight on risk 
sharing exceeds 0.5 if the coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1.3, 
so lower degrees of risk aversion do not necessarily overturn the conclu-
sions of this paper.
The next most important calibration target is the price elasticity of 
demand. A higher price elasticity increases the welfare costs of inflation. 
Welfare ultimately depends on quantities, not prices, but the price elastic-
ity determines how much quantities are distorted by dispersion of relative 
prices. To reduce the optimal policy weight on the debt gap below one-half 
it is necessary to assume price elasticities in excess of 10. Such values 
would be outside the range typical in IO and microeconomic studies of 
demand, with 10 itself being at the high end of the range of values used in 
most macroeconomic models. The typical value of 6 often found in New 
Keynesian models only reduces c to approximately 71 percent.
The results are largely insensitive to the marginal propensity to consume 
from financial wealth, which is used to determine the parameter l in the 
specification of the endogenous discount factors. The Frisch elasticity of 
labor supply has a fairly small but not insignificant effect on the results, 
with the optimal policy weight on risk sharing increasing with the Frisch 
elasticity. A higher elasticity increases the welfare costs of shocks to wealth 
distribution by distorting the labor supply decisions of different households, 
as well as making it easier for monetary policy to influence the real value 
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of debt by changing the ex-ante real interest rate in addition to inflation. An 
elastic labor supply does mean that inflation fluctuations lead to output gap 
fluctuations, which increases the importance of targeting inflation, but the 
first two effects turn out to be more important quantitatively.
The results are somewhat more sensitive to the average duration of a 
price spell and the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output. 
The first of these determines the importance of nominal price rigidities. 
Greater nominal rigidity leads to more dispersion of relative prices from 
a given amount of inflation, and thus reduces the optimal policy weight on 
the debt gap. A higher output elasticity of marginal cost implies that the 
production function has greater curvature, so a given dispersion of output 
levels across otherwise identical firms represents a more inefficient allo-
cation of resources. However, considering the range of reasonable values 
for the duration of price stickiness does not reduce c below 65 percent, and 
the range of marginal cost elasticities does not lead to any c value below 
80 percent.
The effects of the calibration target for the average duration of house-
hold debt are more subtle. It might be expected that the longer the maturity 
of household debt, the higher the optimal policy weight on risk sharing. 
This is because longer-term debt allows inflation to be spread out further 
over time, reducing the welfare costs of the inflation, yet still having an 
effect on the real value of debt. However, the sensitivity analysis shows 
that the optimal policy weight is a non-monotonic function of debt matu-
rity: either very short-term or long-term debt maturities lead to high values 
of c, while debt of around 1.5 years maturity has the lowest value of 
c (approximately 75 percent).
This apparent puzzle is resolved by recalling that there are two ways 
monetary policy can affect risk sharing: inflation to change the ex-post 
real return on nominal debt, and changes in the ex-ante real interest rate 
(“financial repression”). As has been discussed, the first method is effective 
at a lower cost for long debt maturities. When labor supply is inelastic, 
the second method is not available, and the value of c is then indeed a 
strictly increasing function of debt maturity (with the value of c falling to 
15 percent for the shortest-maturity debt). When the ex-ante real interest 
rate method is available, it is most effective compared to the first method 
(taking account of the costs in terms of inflation and output gap fluctua-
tions) when debt maturities are short.
Finally, it is possible to calculate the magnitude of the losses from fol-
lowing a policy of strict inflation targeting rather than the optimal policy 
described above. With strict inflation targeting, equation 55 shows that the 
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innovation to the debt gap is given by the negative of the shock ℘t, with 
the effect on the debt gap in subsequent periods being -l℘t, -l2℘t, and 
so on. The welfare loss (as an equivalent percentage of GDP) from 
strict inflation targeting according to the loss function (equation 56) is 
therefore equal to ℘2t multiplied by the coefficient of d~2t in equation 56 
divided by (1 - bl2).
Using the baseline calibration, a 1-percent shock to the debt gap results 
in a total loss equivalent to 0.023 percent of one year’s GDP, a 5-percent 
shock results in a 0.58-percent GDP loss, and a 10-percent shock results 
in a 2.3-percent loss. These losses are not inconsiderable for large shocks, 
but are negligible for small shocks. With a higher relative risk aversion of 
10, the losses from the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent shocks would 
be 0.078 percent, 2.0 percent, and 7.8 percent of GDP, respectively. The 
expected loss per year is obtained by averaging these over the probability 
distribution of ℘t shocks occurring during a year, which can be derived 
from the stochastic process for real GDP using equation 55. Even though 
losses from large shocks are significant, fortunately the U.S. economy 
only rarely experiences shocks of the order of magnitude seen during the 
financial crisis. Using the 2.1-percent standard deviation of annual real 
GDP growth over the period 1972–2011 suggests that the average annual 
loss from strict inflation targeting would lie in the range 0.1-0.3 percent 
of GDP.
If the average welfare loss from the lack of risk sharing under strict 
inflation targeting is so small, how is it possible that concerns over risk 
sharing receive such a high weight relative to inflation stabilization in the 
optimal monetary policy? The small expected loss might suggest that 
there should be little willingness to pay to obtain insurance. However, note 
that the optimal policy only deviates significantly from inflation targeting 
when large shocks occur (figure 1 is drawn for a 10-percent shock to poten-
tial output). The inflation fluctuations called for in a typical year are around 
five times smaller than those shown in figure 1 and would likely involve 
(annualized) inflation being not much more than 0.4 percent from its aver-
age, for which the welfare losses are vanishingly small.
This means it is possible to put a high weight on replicating complete 
financial markets even when the expected gains from risk sharing are small 
because, unlike an insurance premium, a non-negligible cost of inflation 
fluctuations is incurred only when large shocks occur, which is also when 
the gains from risk sharing are large. Combined with inflation smoothing to 
keep down the welfare losses from relative-price distortions when nominal 
debt has a long average maturity, this means the benefits of greater risk 
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sharing from a long-term nominal GDP target can outweigh the costs even 
without assuming double-digit coefficients of relative risk aversion.
V. Conclusion
This paper has shown how a monetary policy of nominal GDP targeting 
facilitates efficient risk sharing in incomplete financial markets where con-
tracts are denominated in terms of money. In an environment where risk 
derives from uncertainty about future real GDP, strict inflation targeting 
would lead to a very uneven distribution of risk, with leveraged borrowers’ 
consumption highly exposed to any unexpected change in their incomes 
when monetary policy prevented any adjustment of the real value of their 
liabilities. Strict inflation targeting does provide savers with a risk-free real 
return, but fundamentally, the economy lacks any technology that delivers 
risk-free real returns, so the safety of savers’ portfolios is simply the flip 
side of borrowers’ leverage and high levels of risk. Absent any changes in 
the physical investment technology available to the economy, aggregate 
risk cannot be annihilated, only redistributed.
That leaves the question of whether the distribution of risk is efficient. 
The combination of incomplete markets and strict inflation targeting 
implies a particularly inefficient distribution of risk when households are 
risk averse. If complete financial markets were available, borrowers would 
issue state-contingent debt where the contractual repayment was lower in 
a recession and higher in a boom. These securities would resemble equity 
shares in GDP, and they would have the effect of reducing the leverage of 
borrowers and hence distributing risk more evenly. In the absence of such 
financial markets, in particular because of the inability of households to sell 
such securities, a monetary policy of nominal GDP targeting could effec-
tively replicate complete financial markets even when only noncontingent 
nominal debt was available. Nominal GDP targeting operates by stabiliz-
ing the debt-to-GDP ratio. With financial contracts specifying liabilities 
fixed in terms of money, a policy that stabilizes the monetary value of real 
incomes ensures that borrowers are not forced to bear too much aggregate 
risk, converting nominal debt into real equity.
While the model is far too simple to apply to the recent financial crises 
and deep recessions experienced by a number of economies, one policy 
implication does resonate with the predicament of several economies faced 
with high levels of debt combined with stagnant or falling GDPs. Nom-
inal GDP targeting is equivalent to a countercyclical price level, so the 
model suggests that higher inflation can be optimal in recessions. In other 
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words, while each component of the word “stagflation”—“stagnation” and 
“inflation”—is bad in itself, if stagnation cannot immediately be remedied, 
some inflation might be a good idea to compensate for the inefficiency of 
incomplete financial markets. And even if policymakers were reluctant to 
abandon inflation targeting, the model does suggest that they would have 
the strongest incentives to avoid deflation during recessions (a procyclical 
price level). Deflation would raise the real value of debt, which combined 
with falling real incomes would be the very opposite of the risk sharing 
stressed in this paper, and even worse than an unchanging inflation rate.
It is important to stress that the policy implications of the model in reces-
sions are matched by equal and opposite prescriptions during an expansion. 
Thus, it is not just that optimal monetary policy tolerates higher inflation 
in a recession—it also requires lower inflation or even deflation during a 
period of high growth. Pursuing higher inflation in recessions without fol-
lowing a symmetrical policy during an expansion is both inefficient and 
jeopardizes an environment of low inflation on average. Therefore, the 
model also argues that more should be done by central banks to “take away 
the punch bowl” during a boom, even were inflation to be stable.
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Comments and Discussion
Comment By
JAmeS BULLARD1  Modern rationales for monetary stabilization policy 
rely mainly on the sticky price friction. Sticky prices are thought to prevent 
the market solution from being fully optimal and therefore suggest a role 
for monetary policy intervention. Generally speaking, leading renditions of 
this idea lead to the monetary policy advice that prices should be stabilized 
along a price level path. In this fascinating paper, Kevin Sheedy studies an 
alternative rationale for monetary stabilization policy. In the alternative, the 
friction is nonstate contingent nominal contracting (NSCNC), and it is 
this defect of credit markets that keeps the market solution from being 
fully optimal. The monetary policy advice associated with this rationale 
is somewhat different from that associated with sticky prices. Rather than 
keeping prices stable along a price level path, the advice calls for deliberate 
movements in the price level in order to offset shocks to the growth rate of 
national income—countercyclical price level movements.
Sheedy has laid out considerable intuition for the alternative rationale. I 
would go so far as to say that he has set the standard for future analyses in 
this area. The paper includes valuable commentary on an extensive related 
literature, and it includes a calibrated model with both sticky price and 
NSCNC frictions included. In the calibrated case, the more important of the 
two frictions is associated with nonstate contingent nominal contracting.
Is it surprising that the NSCNC friction can be more important from 
a policymaking perspective than the sticky price friction? Perhaps not. 
According to Atif Mian and Amir Sufi (2011), the ratio of household debt 
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to GDP in the United States was about 1.15 before debt rose in the 2000s, 
when it ballooned to 1.65 or more. In today’s dollars, the latter ratio would 
mean about $19.5 to $28 trillion in debt, comprising mostly mortgage debt. 
Improper functioning in these markets might be quite costly for the econ-
omy, so it is certainly plausible that the nonstate contingent nominal con-
tracting friction could be quite important.
My discussion is organized around three questions. First, given that 
some may view the model here as somewhat special, would these results 
hold in a model with many more heterogeneous participants interacting 
in a large private credit market? Based on a general equilibrium life cycle 
model with many period lives, the tentative answer seems to be yes, so that 
Sheedy’s results may have more general applicability than it might first 
appear. The second question is: What are some of the key issues on which 
future research in this area may wish to focus? And finally, what does this 
paper have to say in framing the ongoing global monetary policy debate on 
the wisdom of nominal GDP targeting?
is the moDel speCial? The Sheedy model has two types of households: 
relatively patient and relatively impatient. Since there are just two types 
of agents interacting in a credit market, there is only one set of marginal 
conditions that requires “repair.” The policymaker has just one tool, the 
price level, which in certain circumstances neatly fixes the marginal con-
ditions. A natural question is whether these results would carry over to a 
more realistic environment with more heterogeneity in the private credit 
market. My tentative answer is that the results do carry over to a some-
what different class of models with a greater degree of heterogeneity, and 
therefore that the Sheedy results have greater applicability than may be 
initially apparent.
One way to investigate this is to consider a stripped-down, endowment 
general equilibrium life-cycle economy.2 In order to stress that business 
cycle questions can be addressed with such a model, I will use a “quar-
terly” specification, with households living 241 periods. One interpretation 
would be that households enter economic life around age 20, die around 
age 80, and are most productive in the middle period, around age 50.3 To 
2. See Sheedy (2013) for a three-period overlapping-generations version of this paper.
3. I have in mind a model with a long list of simplifying assumptions: identical within-
cohort agents, no population growth; inelastic labor supply; time-separable log preferences; 
no discounting; no capital; no default; flexible prices; no borrowing constraints; and no gov-
ernment other than the central bank.
364 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring 2014
this standard framework we can add the key assumption made by Sheedy, 
namely that loans are dispersed and repaid in the unit of account—that is, 
in nominal terms—and are not contingent on income realizations. This is 
the NSCNC friction. Agents in the economy I am describing are endowed 
with an identical productivity profile over their lifetime. This productivity 
profile begins at zero, rises to a peak at the middle period of life, and then 
declines to zero, exhibiting perfect symmetry. Agents can sell the produc-
tivity units they have in the labor market at a competitive wage.
Such a model, which is very standard in textbooks, produces very uneven 
income over the life cycle. People near the beginning or end of the life 
cycle earn little or no labor income, while those in the middle of life earn a 
lot. If the productivity profile were exactly triangular, then 50 percent of 
the households would earn 75 percent of the income. All of these cohorts 
will wish to use the credit market to smooth consumption relative to 
income.
A second key assumption in the Sheedy paper is that there is an aggre-
gate shock, and that this shock is the only source of uncertainty.4 Let us 
think of this as a Markov process for the aggregate gross rate of real wage 
growth, which can take on values of high, medium, or low with equal prob-
ability and where the medium value is the average of the three possibili-
ties. Real national income is then the real wage multiplied by the sum of 
the productivity endowments. Therefore, the growth rate of real wages is 
also the growth rate of real output. The policymaker completely controls 
the price level, which is just a unit of account in this model.5 An important 
within-period timing protocol is embedded: (i) nature chooses the growth 
rate, (ii) the policymaker chooses a price level, and (iii) households make 
decisions to consume and save. This timing protocol is what allows the 
policymaker to potentially offset incoming shocks.
The model I have described is simple, but it is interesting in light of 
what Sheedy teaches us about the effects of the NSCNC friction. The ver-
sion I have described has 241 households, all credit market users, each 
with a different level of asset holding depending on their position in the life 
cycle. To calculate the full stochastic equilibrium, one has to keep track of 
the distribution of asset holdings over time, a fact that has made models in 
this class less intensively studied than their representative agent cousins. 
Yet Sheedy’s key insights apply to this model as well, even though there 
4. In models like the one I am describing, it is also popular to include idiosyncratic 
uncertainty, but that is not necessary for the argument presented in the Sheedy paper.
5. For a two-period example along this line, see Koenig (2013).
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are now many more agents and the policymaker still only has one tool, the 
price level.
Consider a nonstochastic balanced-growth path of the model I have 
described, in which the economy simply grows at the average rate forever. 
Assume also that the policymaker “gets out of the way” and simply sets the 
price level to unity every period. On this balanced growth path, consump-
tion is exactly equalized across the cohorts living at a point in time. The 
real interest rate is exactly equal to the real output growth rate.6 The private 
credit market completely solves the point-in-time income inequality prob-
lem. Sheedy provides some excellent intuition for results like this, which 
fuel the findings later: The exact consumption equality across cohorts liv-
ing at a given date means all households have an “equity share” in the 
economy. That is, despite their very uneven incomes at a point in time, 
they all consume an equal fraction of national income available at that 
date. Equity share contracts are known to be optimal when preferences are 
homothetic, as they are in the economy I have described. In the stochastic 
case, the main idea is to replicate this equity share outcome.
CounterCyCliCal priCe-level movements. In the stochastic case, the 
NSCNC friction means that markets are incomplete. Households are not 
allowed to contract based on actual realized returns. There is no default 
or renegotiation—loans must be repaid. However, because of the tim-
ing protocol, the policymaker can potentially provide state-contingent 
movements in the price level after observing the shock each period, and 
therefore restore the complete credit markets outcome.
The nature of this policy involves countercyclical price-level move-
ments. A period associated with a high real growth shock is also a period 
with a lower-than-normal price level, and conversely, low growth is associ-
ated with a higher-than-normal price level. This policy restores complete 
markets because, in the economy I have described, each cohort living at 
date t would consume the same amount, and this amount would be higher 
or lower according to whether the growth rate was particularly high or low 
at that date. In this sense, Sheedy’s results may have important applications 
in a wide class of life-cycle economies, probably the most important class 
of heterogeneous agent economies in macroeconomics.
The countercyclical price-level policy seems very different from one 
focused on not allowing the price level to deviate far from a price-level 
path. We might think of the price-level targeting policy here as maintaining 
6. This is due to the symmetric endowment pattern combined with other simplifying 
assumptions.
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P (t) equal to unity at all times.7 As Sheedy stresses in the paper, such a 
policy would be inappropriate given the NSCNC friction.
DireCtions for future researCh. The Sheedy model has little to say 
about average inflation rates. This is important, since nominal GDP target-
ing is sometimes casually discussed in a way that suggests a rationalization 
for higher average inflation. The Sheedy model calls for higher-than-
average inflation at certain points in time, notably in bad times, but also 
calls for lower-than-average inflation in good times, leaving the average 
rate of inflation unchanged in the long run.
It is sometimes asserted in discussions of nominal GDP targeting that 
one can simply target nominal GDP and not worry about the decomposi-
tion between real output and the price level. I do not see much support for 
this view in the logic behind the Sheedy analysis.8 The typical statement 
might be that the policymaker could target a nominal GDP aggregate gross 
growth rate, perhaps without knowing the exact value of the average real 
growth rate of the economy. This indeed succeeds in obtaining the counter-
cyclical price-level movements necessary under the NSCNC friction to 
complete the credit market. But it does not succeed in maintaining the aver-
age rate of inflation at a desirable level for the economy. In particular, such 
an approach would suggest that the balanced growth path with a gross real 
growth rate of 1.02 and a gross inflation rate of 1.02 was equally as desir-
able as the balanced growth path with 1.00 and 1.04, respectively. Yet this 
would only be true if there were no welfare costs of inflation in the model.
The literature on the welfare cost of inflation is well established and 
argues for lower average inflation as opposed to higher values, all else 
equal. The Sheedy model does not provide any reason to choose the higher 
average inflation value. It only provides a reason to generate higher-than-
average inflation in response to certain shocks and lower-than-average 
inflation in response to other shocks. I conclude from this that proper 
implementation of the Sheedy nominal GDP targeting strategy would 
require knowledge of the average real growth rate for the economy. One 
would have to know when real growth was “below normal” or “above nor-
mal” in order to know when to generate the required price-level move-
ment to maintain complete credit markets. If the policymaker did not know 
the average growth rate of the economy and targeted only a nominal GDP 
growth rate, the policymaker could end up with an average inflation rate 
7. Assuming a net inflation target of zero.
8. The total real output in the economy at a date t would be the real wage multiplied by 
the sum of endowments, and the latter would cancel in this expression.
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considerably different from the desired level. This could undo all the good 
done by the complete credit markets policy.
I think further research on the trade-off between the benefits of targeting 
a pure nominal quantity and the costs of inadvertently generating higher-
than-desirable inflation could be a fruitful area of future research. I cau-
tion potential researchers, however: The literature on the welfare costs of 
inflation tends to find that the welfare losses from higher average inflation 
are much larger than the welfare gains reported in Sheedy’s paper from 
improved monetary stabilization policy.
Many have argued that the NSCNC friction is not as compelling as it 
may first appear. This is because we do observe default in actual econo-
mies, and because of this there is a certain state-contingency in actual con-
tracting that is assumed away in models like Sheedy’s. Research along the 
lines of Sheedy’s that could make better contact with the issue of default 
could provide helpful insight. More subtly, the mere threat of default can 
radically shape equilibrium outcomes, even in models where no default 
occurs in equilibrium. For an example of how endogenous debt constraints 
change one’s view of potential equilibria in a life cycle setting like the one 
described above, see Costas Azariadis and Luisa Lambertini (2003). More 
research in this area would be desirable as well, especially if it could shed 
more and sharper light on the likely importance or unimportance of what 
seems to be non-state-contingent contracting in actual economies.
Finally, Sheedy’s model has no money demand, treating the role of money 
only as a unit of account. What Sheedy is advocating is a policy that focuses 
on completing the credit market and ignores households that are holding 
money balances as a large fraction of their wealth. The people who are in 
this latter situation may be hurt economically by a monetary policy sharply 
focused on credit markets. In the United States, some estimates suggest 10 
to 15 percent of the population is unbanked, and another 10 to 15 percent 
may be nearly unbanked. These households tend to be poor and to use 
cash intensively, and they may be shut out of credit markets. Research on 
models that include this group may provide a better balance in assessing 
the best role for monetary policy.
This paper has considerable potential to sharpen the ongoing debate 
on nominal GDP targeting, an idea that has not often had an explicit 
modern macroeconomic model behind it. Those interested in studying 
nominal GDP targeting can proceed from the Sheedy model and study 
the many additional issues that could arise if policymakers adopted the 
idea of countercyclical price-level movements as optimal monetary policy. 
Others can investigate the extent to which NSCNC may or may not be as 
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important a friction as it appears to be, perhaps because of the way credit 
default is conceptualized and modeled. Both types of research would likely 
improve our understanding of the NSCNC friction and monetary policy’s 
role in alleviating it.
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Comment By
IVÁn WeRnInG1  This paper by Kevin Sheedy argues that risk sharing 
should be an important goal in the conduct of monetary policy. It makes two 
distinct contributions in this direction. First, it presents a tractable model in 
which inflation affects risk sharing, applying this to derive implications for 
monetary policy. Nominal GDP targeting is shown to achieve optimal risk 
sharing in incomplete market settings with flexible prices. Second, it pits 
the new risk sharing goal for monetary policy against the traditional sta-
bilization role. For a calibrated New Keynesian economy featuring sticky 
prices, the paper finds that significant weight should be placed on the risk 
sharing goal, affecting the reaction to technology shocks.
These ideas are important, and the effort to push standard representative- 
agent macroeconomic models to incorporate heterogeneous agents is laud-
able and, here, accomplished very elegantly. The paper helps create a 
bridge between the monetary policy literature, typically divorced of 
risk-sharing considerations, with a literature focusing on risk sharing that 
is typically divorced of monetary and nominal considerations.
Sheedy definitely succeeds at making one think about risk sharing and 
monetary policy in a more systematic way. As a discussant, I found little 
to disagree with within the confines of the paper’s setting. However, I do 
1. My views were enriched by exchanges with Adrien Auclert and Matt Rognlie.
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believe that a few important elements are missing and that they need to 
be incorporated to assess the appropriateness of risk sharing as a goal for 
monetary policy.
I will begin by restating the main idea of risk sharing with flexible prices 
in a simple static model. I then incorporate heterogeneous risk exposures 
and idiosyncratic uncertainty, two features that I believe are crucial to any 
discussion of risk sharing. These may weaken the case for nominal GDP 
targeting in particular, although not necessarily for inflation-induced risk 
sharing in general. Finally, I briefly touch on elements that may affect the 
trade-off between risk sharing and stabilization. I conclude that, rather than 
being competing goals, risk sharing and stabilization may be complemen-
tary ones.
risk sharing anD nominal gDp targeting. Let me reduce the argument 
for inflation-induced risk sharing and nominal GDP targeting to its bare 
essentials, within a static risk-sharing model.
Two agents, B (borrowers) and S (savers), have a common utility func-
tion u(c). Income is distributed proportionally, with yB = yBY and yS = ySY, 
assuming that yB > yS.
Let us assume, momentarily, that a conditional transfer T(Y) is available. 
The planning problem is
u Y T Y u Y T Y
T B B S S
max ,
i
[ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )λ ψ − + λ ψ +
( )

where lB and lS are Pareto weights. From now on I specialize to equal 
weights lB = lS = 1, since nothing of interest is lost by doing so.
The expectation above is taken over aggregate income Y. However, the 
maximization can be performed for each realization of aggregate income Y,
u Y T Y u Y T Y
T Y B S
{ }( ) ( )( ) ( )ψ − + ψ +
( )
max .
The optimum equalizes consumption by setting
T Y YB S(1)
2
.( ) = ψ − ψ
One can implement this optimal state-contingent transfer using nominal 
debt, D, and a state-contingent price level, P(s), satisfying
T Y D
P Y
,( ) ( )=
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or substituting using our solution (equation 1),
iY P Y D
B S
( ) =
ψ − ψ
2
,
a constant value for nominal spending. Optimal policy can be characterized 
as targeting nominal GDP.
heterogeneous exposure to aggregate risk. Following the paper, I 
assumed above that individual income moves in proportion with aggre-
gate income—the elasticity of individual income with respect to aggregate 
income is unity. Consider instead
y YB B ,( )= ϕ
y Y YS B ,( )= − ϕ
for some function jB(z). The elasticity of the borrower’s income to aggre-
gate income may now depart from one. By the same arguments I obtain
T Y Y YB( ) ( )= ϕ −
1
2
.
This shows that, in general, T(Y) is no longer proportional to aggregate 
income Y. As long as T(Y) does not change signs, I can implement the 
transfers by T(s) = D/P(s) for some P(s) > 0. Let us assume this is the case. 
By implication, it is no longer the case that nominal spending Y z P(Y) is 
constant. Instead,
Y Y P Y DB( )( ) ( )ϕ − =12 .
For example, if the income of borrowers is more responsive to aggregate 
income, so that the elasticity of jB(Y) is greater than one, then the price level 
P(Y) should also have an elasticity greater than one in absolute value. 
That is, the price level should be more responsive than nominal GDP 
targeting.
iDiosynCratiC unCertainty. The paper abstracts from idiosyncratic 
income risk. This is unfortunate, because it is well appreciated that the 
uncertainty households face trumps aggregate uncertainty.
To incorporate idiosyncratic uncertainty, let us assume
y Y y YBi Bi Si Siand ,= ε = ε
Comments and DisCussion 371
where eBi and eSi are idiosyncratic realizations for individual i within each 
respective group. The case without idiosyncratic uncertainty is now a spe-
cial case where Var [e] = 0. One important example of e may be a speci-
fication that captures unemployment risk, with e = 0 when the agent is 
unemployed.
The planning problem is
i
u Y T Y u Y T Y
T B S
max .[ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )ε − + ε +
( )
The first-order condition is
 u Y T Y s u Y T Y YB S[ ] [ ]( ) ( )( ) ( )′ ε − = ′ ε +ε ε(2) ,
which equalizes average marginal utility after each realization of aggregate 
income Y. As before, as long as T(Y) does not change signs we can imple-
ment the transfers by T(s) = D/P(s) for some P(s) > 0. Let us assume this 
is the case.
I want to investigate whether
T s Y s( ) ( )= τ(3)
for some t. For this purpose, it is helpful to assume a homogeneous utility 
function u(c) = c1-s/(1 - s). Substituting the guess (equation 3) into equa-
tion 2, one finds that validating the guess requires
 Y YB S[ ] [ ]( ) ( )ε − τ = ε + τε −σ ε −σ
to hold for some fixed t for all realizations of Y. This is not generally pos-
sible, except in the special case where eB and eS are independent of Y. There 
is a large empirical literature documenting the fact that idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty varies over the business cycle. When idiosyncratic shocks are not 
independent of aggregate ones, the optimal policy for P(Y) will not target 
nominal GDP.
is inflation the right tool? Idiosyncratic uncertainty also highlights 
how imperfect inflation—or any tool that depends only on aggregates and 
does not condition on idiosyncratic shocks—is for risk-sharing purposes. 
Other policies, such as progressive taxes or unemployment insurance ben-
efits, do provide insurance against idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Equally relevant, the paper assumes that borrowers take on debt that is 
no-contingent and free of risk. However, as the recent crisis reminds us, 
both secured and unsecured consumer credit is not risk-free, and borrowers 
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default on both forms of debt, providing a form of state contingency that is 
tailored to idiosyncratic conditions.
Overall, for these reasons, inflation is a relatively coarse tool for dealing 
with the uncertainty that households face. It may be argued, however, that 
once other available instruments are exhausted, there remains a residual 
role to be played by inflation. Knowing just how significant that role should 
be is crucial if one is going to have monetary policy deviate from its tradi-
tional role.
GeneRAL DISCUSSIon  Robert Shimer asked an empirical question: 
how tightly is the consumption decline during a recession linked to an 
individual’s debt load? He thought the individuals who experienced the 
largest declines in consumption might have no debt load on account of 
their nonparticipation in credit markets. Shimer thought that smoothing 
out inflation would not be very effective at helping this group of people. 
It seemed to him that in principle this was something one could address 
using existing data.
He also agreed with discussant Iván Werning that using inflation alone in 
the model is not going to work. As he understood the model, even the opti-
mal rate of inflation was still not going to have better than a second-order 
benefit. If it turned out that the modeling was far off because of incomplete 
risk sharing, one could imagine achieving a first-order benefit from infla-
tion. But which way it goes is going to depend on how consumption declines 
during recessions or is related to debt holdings, and Shimer acknowledged 
that he did not know how that works.
Johannes Wieland asked the author to clarify the trade-off between infla-
tion targeting and nominal GDP targeting. He wondered if it would be bet-
ter to target inflation volatility instead of GDP.
Gerald Cohen found the concept of a natural rate of debt to GDP to be 
rather frightening. He said he had not been able to find a theoretical justifi-
cation for any particular ratio of debt to GDP. Ever since 2008, people have 
been talking about the economy needing to be deleveraged, but Cohen said 
that whenever he asked others what the optimal ratio of debt to GDP would 
be, they could only wave their hands or, in his view, invent a number. Peo-
ple once talked about a ratio of 130 percent, but looking in retrospect today 
most people think that number is too high, and now a common figure is 
90 percent. Cohen’s feeling was that if one is going to target an optimal 
ratio one ought to have a good theory behind it.
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Justin Wolfers wondered why financial incompleteness existed at all. He 
speculated that when people obtained a mortgage they might often wonder 
why it was that the real value of the payoffs would be allowed to decline 
over the course of the mortgage. After all, one could simply write a debt 
contract in real terms, and if half the mortgage industry began to do that the 
rest would certainly follow suit.
Kevin Sheedy responded to the comments made during this brief dis-
cussion. First, he pointed out that he used a 10 percent fall in potential 
output in his paper—certainly a huge shock but a reasonable size relative 
to people’s expectations of the trends prior to the financial crisis. And 
when he did, he found that such a shock led to only a 2-percentage-point 
increase in inflation over a decade. Since a shock of that magnitude is 
rare, Sheedy suggested that there would be little impact on inflation vola-
tility. In his view, then, during a “great moderation” period there would 
not be any tension between targeting nominal GDP and targeting infla-
tion. So the policy of nominal GDP targeting would be a good one when 
the economy needed it, when it was hit with really big real shocks, and 
when the need was not there one would not have to tolerate a lot of 
inflation volatility. This is key to explaining why the weight on risk 
sharing is so high.
Additionally, Sheedy noted, with long-term debt contracts inflation is 
smoothed out over time, so there is less relative price distortion and less 
aggregate volatility. So although the benefits of the policy may be small 
when one considers other factors, such as idiosyncratic risk, the costs of 
achieving the policy would also be relatively small. Lastly, he agreed with 
some discussants that financial market frictions might be entirely removed 
at some point in the future, but he did not believe that would occur soon. 
Given the prevalence of nominal debt contracts, he believed the case for 
nominal GDP targeting was still strong.

